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TRADE liberalization has figured prominently in Philippine
development strategies in the past decade. Within this period, two
major tariff- reform programs, complemented by a series of import
liberalization measures, were launched.
According to neoclassical trade theory, an out,yard-looking trade
policy will enhance industrial growth through a "challenge-response"
mechanism leading to improvements in efficiency and
competitiveness. But past studies seeking to establish the llnk between
trade policy and industrial performance and competitiveness have
generally yielded inconclusive results. Recent contributions to the
literature suggest that in studying the trade policy-productivity nexus,
factors related to the industrial structure as well as other domestic
market conditions need to be examined.The main thesis is that trade
liberalization exerts only an indirect effect on performance and
competitiveness. The degree and direction of this effect depends on
the nature of' the industrial structure, firm-specific factors, and other
domestic market conditions.
From this perspective, this paper aims to evaluate the impact of
the country's recent trade liberalization experience on the
performance, competitiveness, and structure of the Philippine
packaging industry. It will examine changes in the industry's levels of
protection and the corresponding changes, if any, on the levels of
allocative and technical efficiency, competitiveness, and productivity.
It will also study factors related to the industrial structure --
concentration, barriers to entry, and market power _ and their
influence, if any, on the abovementioned variables. The analysis is2 4 Ma. Cristina S. Medilo
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made at the level of the industry, the different subsectors; and at the
plant level when possible.
SIGNIFICANCEOF THE STUDY
Several past studies, most of them utilizing cross-country data,
have examined the effects of trade reform on industrial efficiency and
competitiveness. But few have considered the role of the industrial
structure and plant-level characteristics in explaining the differences
in the responses ofindustries or individual plants to trade policy shifts.
This study usesplant-level data from the National Statistics OFfice
(NSO) 1983 and 1988 Census of Manufacturing Establishments
(CME). These are supplemented by data gathered from a firm-level
survey conducted by the Philippine Institute for Development
Studies, covering the period 1986 and 1991.
The packaging industry has been chosen asthe subject of inquiry
because it is an import-substituting, import-dependent industry
insulated from foreign competition prior to the Trade Liberalization
Program (TLP).And although it has been subsequently liberalized, it
still enjoys a certain degree of protection under the existing tariff
structure.
The growing significance of the packaging industry in the
economy is undeniable. Most manufactured products require some
form of packaging.The demand for packaging has kept pace with the
growth of the manufacturing sector, particularly of its end-using
industries. Although the industry accounted for only 3.3 percent of
manufacturing value added in 1988, its value added grew steadily
relative to that of the manufacturing sector, asshown in Figures 1 and
2.
The packaging industry also playsa significant role in the success
of the export sector, particularly in the agricultural and processed
food subsectors, which require high-quality Packaging.The share of
packaging to total product cost in the export-oriented processed food
subsector, for instance, can run from 20 to 70 percent (Philexport
1992). Policies affecting the packaging industry will thus haveFigures I and 2
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important repercussions on this subsector and on other end-using
industries as well.
The role of the industrial structure in the trade policy-
productivity nexus is exemplified in the packaging industry because it
constitutes different subsectors Characterized by different degrees of
concentration and different heights of entry barriers. The different
subsectors, in varying degrees, typify the dualistic market structure,
usually found in developing countries. This dualism is characterized
by the co-existence of an oligopolistic core (consisting of a few big
plants dominating the market in terms ofsales,employment, and value
added) and a competitive fringe (made up of a number of smallplants i
accounting for only a small portion of total industry sales,
employment, and value added) (Rodrik 1988b). The differences in
the characteristics ofphnts in the upper and lower ends of the industry
spectrum may explain the discrepancies in their reactions to trade
policy reform.
SCOPE OF THE STUDY
The study covers the period 1981 to 1991.The years 1983 and
1988 are viewed asreference points representing the subperiods before
and duringthe fuUimplementation of the 1981 Trade Liberahzation
Program (TLP).
The 1981 TLP consisted of the Tariff Reform and the Import
Liberalization Programs. Of these, only the former proceeded as
scheduled. By 1985, the targeted rates had been achieved. Plans to
liberahze import licensing were suspended in 1983, however, because
of the severe balance-of-payments crisis in 1983-1984. hnport
liberalization efforts began anew with the Aquino administration in
1986. It was only then that the 1981 TLP was fully implemented.The
years 1983 and 1988 have been chosen as reference points mainly
because of data constraints: the most recent Censuses on
manufacturing establishments were conducted during these years.
The study also attempts to cover the year 1991, when the next
round of major tariff reforms began to be implemented. Survey dataPackaging Industry I_ 5
are gathered through questionnaires and are analyzed together with
1986 data, to allow for five-year period of comparison.
The study uses the packaging product classification scheme based
on raw materials used,which groups products asfollows: (1) glass;(2)
metal; (3) paper; (4) rigid plastics; (5) flexible plastics; (6) composite
flexibles; and (7)wood. It does not cover wooden packaging. Neither
does it make any distinctions between rigid and flexible plastics and
composite flexibles,
Following this classificationscheme, the packaging industry under
study thus comprises four heterogeneous subsectors: (1) glass-based;
(2) metal-based; (3)paper-based; and (4) plastic-based. Tables 1 and 2
list the different types of packaging products and the raw materials
used in their production, respectively.
HYPOTHESES
The study examines the following hypotheses:
1) Trade reform generally leads to improvements in efficiency and
competitiveness.
2) The positive effect of trade liberalization on efficiency and
competitiveness may be either enhanced or dampened by the
industrial structure and other plant-specific factors.6 _1 Ma,CristinaS,Medilo
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Table 1
Type ofPackaging Products byRawMaterials Used
Products
Glass-based Bottles; jars; tumblers; jugs; vials; ampoules; cart_s
Metal-based Cans; collapsibles; caps; closures
Paper-based Corrugated andnon-corrugated cartons; foldings, parcels, andbags;
rigid (set-up) boxes; instruction leaflets andlabels; fiber drums; other
applications such asbradng, blocking, partitioning materials inside
boxes tohold products inplace
PlasUc-based Bottles andjars; plastic tubes; vialsand sleeves; crates anddrums;
closures; wraps andoverwraps; preformed bags; envelopes; form-fill-
sealpouches
Source :Philexport, 1992.
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Glass.based Silica sand; soda ash; limestone; feldspar; dolomite; saltcake; cuUet
(bmksn glass); gypsum; sodium nitrate; arsenic trioxide; fluorspar;
selenium; sulfur; charcoal pyrite;, chromite
Metal-based Tinplate; tinfree steel; twocold.reduced (2CR); aluminum; lead; tin;
aluminum; coating materials; fluxing agents; sealing compounds;
copper wire
Paper-based Newsprint; printing andwriting paper, tissue paper; corrugating
medium (linerboard andfluting material); bleached board; claycoated
boxboard; chipboard; cartonboard; sad(paper; other kraft and
wrapping paper; other typos ofpaper andpaperboard
PlasUc-based Polyethylene; polypropylene; polysterene; polyvinyl chloride;
polyethylene terephthalate; colorants; plastic films; cellophane;
metallized polyester*
• used incomposite Ilexlbles
Source: Phtlsxport; 1992,
Bill IIII I • I II I2
• t _ao_ooo#aott ttag_too#####Q##Q
Reviewof Related Literature
TI s chapter surveys related studies on the relationship among trade
liberalization, efl_cienc% and the industrial structure. It also reviews
previous studies on the local packaging industry.
STUDIESONTRADE POLICY,INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE,
PERFORMANCE, AND COMPETITIVENESS
In a survey article on trade policy and productivity gains in
developing countries, Havrylyshyn (1990) stressed the lack of a cohesive
unifying theory of how trade affects #ciency. Empirical findings are
similarly inconclusive. Pack (1988), for instance, noted that "there is
no clear confirmation of the hypothesis that countries with an
external orientation benefit, from greater growth in technical
efficiency in the component sectors of manufacturing."
Nishimizu and Robinson (1984), however, established important
links between trade policy and industrial productivity performance.
They observed that total factor productivity growth (TFP) was more
rapid in the export-oriented Korean economy than in the more
internally-oriented economies of Turkey and Yugoslavia. But they
acknowledged that the causality may have worked in the reverse
direction, export expansion being induced by productivity growth.
Tybout, de Melo, and Corbo (1991) revealed that although there
was little overall productivity growth in the Chilean manufacturing
sector after the trade reform, industries that experienced marked
reductions in protection showed the biggest improvements in average
efficiency levels. Small plants increased production to minimum
efficient scale after the lowering of protection. In view of" these
positive indications on the sectoral level, the authors posited that the8 _1 Ma,Cristina S,Medilo
overall efficiency gains resulting from trade reform may have been
eclipsed by the macroeconomic criseswhich hit the Chilean economy
shortly after the policy shift.
Finding no strong direct evidence to support the trade policy-
productivity nexus, Havrylyshyn (1990) suggested that one way to
explain the link is through the larger total market available when
exports are not discouraged, which allows for both (1) increases in
capacity utilization and (2) economies of scale arising from
specialization.
Page (1980), for instance, found no significant relationship
between firm size and technical efficiency in Indian manufacturing
industries. He discovered instead the importance of capacity
utilization in explaining differences in efficiency.
Despite these conflicting findings and varying propositions,
however, a common observation seems to emerge, aspointed out by
Pack (1988: 341):
...important characteristics of economies exist apart from the
internationaltraderegime andmayexert decisiveeffectson economic
development,atruismoften noted but occasionallylostsightof in the
recentemphasison the importance of tradepolicies...
And again (p.351),
While the forces of international competition are undoubtedly an
important catalyst for improving economic performance, purely
domestic factorshavemuch to contribute.
Along the same line, Caves (1985) noted the "importance _of
competitive conditions in determining the speed and efficiency of
domestic markets' adjustment to international disturbances." He
emphasized that product differentiation affects the sensitivity of
domestic prices to shiftsin import prices.
Harrison (1989) made the same observation. Using firm-level
data from the Ivory Coast to examine the relationships among
productivity, imperfect competition, and trade reform, she found thatPackaging Industry > 9
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the link was strong when perfect competition is assumed. But the
relationship "virtually disappears when variations in price-cost
margins resulting from trade liberalization are allowed for:' Hence,
the need to include the industrial structure variable in any unbiased
estimation of productivity growth.
As Kirkpatrick and Maharaj (1992: 106) noted, the role of the
industrial structure cannot be overemphasized:
The indeterminacy of the effect that trade liberalization has on
productivity performance Canbe traced to the uncertainty about the
way in which industrial enterprises respond to the new set of
incentives established by trade policy changes.The reaction of firms is
conditioned by the non-competitive structure of the industrial sector
market.
Both the), and Harrison (1990) suggested that future research
focus on country-level disaggregated data to identify the linkages
among trade liberalization, industrial structure, and firms'
productivity performance.
STUDIES ON THE PHILIPPINEPACKAGINGINDUSTRY
Most of the studies on the Philippine packaging industry focused
on the business or entrepreneurial aspect. The studies made by the
Center for Research and Communication (CRC 1987) and the
Private Development Corporation of the Philippines (PDCP 1988)
concentrated on the industry's strengths and weaknesses, its viability
relative to other industries, its supply and demand conditions, and the
formulation of strategies to enhance its competitiveness. Little
attention was paid to economic or policy issues,although the PDCP
study recommended lowering tariff rates on packaging raw materials
to make the industry more competitive.
A recent study by Philexport (1992) examined the structure,
standards, technology, and supply and demand conditions of the
industry. It compared the local industry with its counterparts in other
ASEAN countries such asMalaysia and Thailand and concluded that
the local industry isway behind itsASEAN counterparts both in terms10 _ Ma,Cristina S,Medilo
of technology employed and price competitiveness.This was the first
study to address the problems between the industry and its end-using
industries, it advocated the lowering of tariffs both on finished
packaging goods and raw materials.
Closer to thisstudy is the paper byDe Dios, Bautista,and De Dios
(1993) which examined the relationship between the packaging
industry and the agricultural and agro-processing sectors. It focused
on the structure and organization of the industry and on its linkages
with these two sectors. It also evaluated the effects of the 1991 Tariff
Reform Program on all three sectors through a simulation exercise
based on the hastened implementation of the rates prescribed under
the Program.The results point to a"win-win" situation for allsectors.
Most of these studies have relied on aggregated census data,
glossing over changes at the level of the plant.3
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Theoretical Framework
_tPIRICAL studies have shown that protection reduces industrial
sector efficiency (Tybout et al. 1991). First, in markets characterized
by entry barriers, the absence of foreign competition allows
incumbents to enjoy market power and earn excess profits.The mason
is that tariffsdrive a wedge between domestic price and the free trade
price, which is supposed to be equal to marginal cost. Consequently,
these firms may fail to produce at minimum efficient scale (achieve
scaleefficiency) and achieve the maximum possible Output from their
input bundles (achieve technical efficiency or "X-efficiency").
Second, in markets characterized by Chamberlinian competition,
trade protection may attract inefficient small producers, causing
similar increases in average costs. In both cases,the absence of import
competition allows the firms to lead a "quiet life," producing
uncompetitive products at uncompetitive prices.
It is argued that trade liberalization would reverse the negative
effects of protection, enhancing industrial sector efficiency. Domestic
firms facing import competition will be forced to cut down on costs,
streamline their operations, and adopt new technologies. Inefficient
and uncompetitive firms would have to either brace up or be eased
out of the market. A new industrial structure better suited to the
international environment would then emerge.
However, past studies seeking to establish the relationship between
trade liberalization and industrial performance and competitiveness
have generally yielded inconclusive results. Recent contributions to
the literature stress the role of the less-than-perfectly competitive
industrial structure and other plant-specific factors in explaining the
trade policy-productivity nexus.
This chal:ter presents the framework for analyzing the impact of
trade liberalization on efficiency, competitiveness, and the industrial12 _1 Ma. Cristina S. Medilo
structure. It also discusses the relationship among the last three
variables, particularly as trade liberalization impinges on them.
EFFICIENCY
Efficiencywithin theEconomyI
Economic performance isgenerally associated with efficiency.The
notion of efficiency within the economy may be explained through
the production possibility frontier (PPF) shown in Figure 3.The PPF
portrays the maximum attainable output of X against any given
amount of Y when all available resources are fully employed using
best-practice technology and efficient management techniques. Points
on the frontier thus represent technicallyefficient,attainable output
combinations of X and Y. Points outside the frontier represent
unattainableoutpu. A point such as A "inside" the frontier, is also
attainable but it represents either underutilizationor inefficientuse of
resources, or both, since available resources could be efficiently and
fully utilized to produce a higher output level, that is, a production
point on the frontier.A movement to apoint such asB on the frontier
would thus constitute an efficiency gain.
Suppose that the relativemarket prices 0fgoods X andY are given
by the price line MMLAbstracting from consumption, equilibrium in
production would be represented by point B where the marginal rate
of transformation (the slope of the PPF) is equal to the prevailing
price ratio between the two goods. Point B represents a technically and
al!ocatively efficientoutput combination. Production at this point fully
utilizes existingresources and attainsthemaximumpotentialoutput,yielding
a combinationof the twogoods which is consistentwith prevailingrelative
prices. Point C, while being a technically efficient point, is not
allocatively efficient since it represents an output combination
inconsistent with prevailing relativeprices.
1. The author is grateful to Dr. John Power for outlining the main ideas of this










Suppose, however, that marketprices diverge from socialor shadow
prices due to a restrictive trade regime. Assume that the price line
MM' gives the ratio of protected prices. Border or shadow relative
prices, on the other hand, are given by SS'.Thus, protection has made
good Y more expensive and likewise more profitable than X,inducing
the aUocatiot_of more resources to the production of good Y when,
in fact, more of good X should have been produced. Under these
conditions, point B would no longer correspond to an allocatively
efficient combination. Correcting• the distortion in relative output
prices such that SS' becomes the price line faced by industries would
induce them to reaUocate resources to produce the more desired output
combination, which is point c.
While a movement from point A to B would primarily represent
gains in technical efficiency (although it may likewise indicate
improvemems in aUocativeefficiency), the movement from point B to
C would represent gains in allocative efficiency alone (since any14 ,q Ma, Cristina S, Medilo
production point on the frontier would already be technically
efficient). Technical efficiency gains may be due only to non-price
factors, whereas aUocative efficiency improvements would call for
changes in relative prices. Among the non-price factors leading to
efficiency gains are:
1) increased access to supplier technology,
2) better management techniques,
3) higher quality standards, and
4) growth due to increased demand in end-using industries.
Price-related measures include tariff and tax reforms falling in the
realm of public policy.
Plant-levelEffkiency
Plant-level efficiency may be measured using the analytical
framework based on the economic theory of production and cost
(Solow 1967). The core of the theory is the production function,
which specifies a certain relationship between a vector of maximum
producible outputs and a vector of factors of production.
If a plant employed two factors of production in a well-behaved
linearly homogeneous production function, production decisions may
be represented in input space by a point giving the combination of
primary factors required to generate one unit of output (Page 1980).
The different input combinations possible for each plant give rise to a
scatter of observations in the input plane which, when joined,
represent the industry production function. Figure 3 shows one such
production function, FF', defined by a given state of technology.
Since the function limits the range of possible observations, that
is,since it refers only to the maximum output attainable from a given
bundle of inputs (or, what is the same, the minimum quantities of
inputs required to produce a certain level of output), it may be
meaningfully called afrontier production function (Forsund, Lovell,
and S:'hmidt 1980). Points on the frontier constitute the potential or
"best practice" output. The amount by which measured or actualPackaging Indt,stry I_ 15
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output is less than potential output may be regarded asa measure of
inefficiency.
Following Page (1980), the level efficiency can be decomposed
into technical efficiency and choice of technique. Consider Figure 4.
Let L and K represent labor and capital and let points A, B, C, and D
represent different plants. Plants B and C are both efficient but plant A
is inefficient since it uses more inputs than is required to produce the
level of output given by the production frontier. The ratio OB/OA
measures plant A's level of technicalin_ciency, implying an excessiveuse
of factors of production.
Technical efficiency has often been referred to as X-efficiency
(Leibenstein 1966) and is usually associated with the plant's access to
technology as well as the role of management in the production
process.
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Now let MM' be the prevailing market relative factor price line
faced by the plants.Plant B would then be similarly inefficient since it
usesthe wrongcombinationoffactors at the existingfactorprices.Theratio
OD/OB measures plant B's level of in_ciency due to wrongchoiceof
techniquesince it incurs higher costs than plant D which lies on the
same price line as wholly efficient plant C. The ratio OD/OA
measures totalinqo_ciency, that is,technical inefficiency and inefficiency
due to wrong choice of technique.
Suppose now that, due to distortions arising from a restrictive
policy regime, marketprices ofproducts and factors diverge from their
socialor shadow prices (Page 1980). Assume that the relative social
prices of inputs are given by the slope SS'. Phnt B thus becomes
technically efficient and uses the right technique, while plantC uses
the wrong technique. But if the distortions are not corrected, plant C
would seem to apply the right technique -- instead of plant B
since it saves on input costs by using apparently cheaper capital.
Correcting the distortion may induce firm C to adopt the more
appropriate production choices of plant B -- that is,it would employ
more labor, which would cost less at shadow prices.
According to Kirkpatrick and Maharaj (1992), productivity
improvements that will enable plant A to move to plant C's position
represent only static efficiency gains.A gain in dynamic productivity,
usually referred to as technological progress, will occur when the
production frontier itself shifts toward the origin. This study is
confined to analyzing static efficiency.
The study utilizes the concept of Domestic Resource Cost (DRC)
in measuring aUocativeefficiency and efficiency in terms of choice of
technique. Simply put, the DRC is a cost-benefit ratio representing
the social opportunity cost of domestic resources used per unit of net
foreign exchange earned (or saved) by the export (or import
substitution) of a given product (Bautista and Power 1979). In the ex
post sense, the Dt_C can be viewed as a measure of allocative
inefficiency -- that is, of the costs due to the misallocation of
resources into industries or sectors where, productivity is not
maximized. Such misallocation of resources among industries may be
due to price distortions under a restrictive trade regime. At the plantPackaging Industry I_ 17
level, misallocation may take the form of wrong choice of technique
due to distortions in relative input prices caused by protectionist
policies.The higher the DR.C, the greater the cost of protection.The
economy would do well to cut back on that industry's or plant's
activity.
The study measures technical efficiency by estimating the frontier
production function through linear programming techniques. The
optimization problem minimizes the deviations of actual from
maximum potential output subject to a number of constraints.
These two methods of measurement will be explained in the next
chapter.
The findings of a recent study linking trade policy, structure, and
performance in Colombia (World Bank 1991) revealed the impact of
trade reform on efficiency. The study showed that industries with
higher import penetration ratios gained the largest productivity
improvements. Thus, DR.C ratios; representing levels of allocative
inefficiency and inefficiency due to wrong choice of technique, may
be expected to be inversely related to import penetration ratios
that is, lower DR.C ratios may be expected after the trade reform.
Technical efficiency, on the other hand, is expected to improve after
the trade reform. In the two models presented above, trade
liberalization isexpected to rationalize the industrial structure (Figure
3) and reduce plant-level costs (Figure 4).
COMPETITIVENESS
International competitiveness refers to the ability of the sector,
industry, or plant to compete in domestic markets with importers and
in external markets with other exporters (including domestic
producers in the destination market) (Tecson 1992). Competitiveness
is linked to the concept of comparative advantage.While comparative
advantage reflects social profitability, competitive advantage reflects
private profitability.The relationship between these two concepts may
be expressed by the following formula, where Dg.Crefers to the
usual domestic resource cost measure based on shadow prices:18 _ Ma,Cristina S,Medilo
D_CM = DRCM . SER . DR C
OER DR C OER SER
where
DRCM = DRC in market (asopposed to shadow) prices
OER = official exchange rate
DRCM/OER = competitive advantage
DR.CM/DI_C = ratio representing distortions attributable to
the domestic tax system and the wage structure
SER = shadow exchange rate
SER./OER = ratio representing distortions attributable to
trade and commercial policy
DR.C/SER = comparative advantage
DRC differs from DRCM in that it takes wage legislation-, tax-,
and tariff-related distortions into account while the latter considers
only distortions attributable to the tariff structure.Thus, competitive
advantage differs from comparative advantage because of distortions
in the local tax system, the wage structure, and the exchange rate
regime. These differences are reflected in the above formula. An
industry or plant, then, may have comparative advantage in an activity
but still be uncom_etitive due to the distortions cited.
STRucTURE
Empirical studies have shown that in markets characterized by
Chamberlinian competition, protection encourages the proliferation
of small firms operating at suboptimal output levels. Markets
characterized by entry barriers, on the other hand, allow incumbents
to enjoy market power in the absence of foreign competition. In both
cases,protection shapes, as it were, the industrial structure which, in
turn, affects efficiency level in the industry.
It is argued that trade liberalization will rationalize the market
structure by forcing ineflqcient firms out of business and reducing the
market power of incumbents in "high-barrier" sectors. Nonetheless,Packaging Industry I_ 19
the impact of trade liberalization on the industrial structure and,
consequently, on performance and competitiveness, depends on the
nature of the industrial structure itself.
Two aspects of the industrial structure that have received
considerable attention in recent years are concentration and entry
barriers.
Concentrationrefers to the extent to which an economicactivity is
dominatedby afew largeJirms(Lee 1992). Since the insignificance of
individual sellers relative to the market is one of the major forces of
perfect competition, the degree of competition is inversely rehted to
the degree of concentration.
A distinction must be made between production and seller
concentration. Technically, seller concentration is production
concentration if imports and exports are ignored (Lee 1992). The
concentration ratios used in the study (discussedin Chapter IV) thus
measure production concentration since they do not take imports and
exports into account.
Regressions correlating industrial structure with productivity
performance in Colombia (WB Report 1991) revealed that the
degree of concentration isinversely rehted to the level ofproductivity
growth. This corresponds to the theory that, in the absence of
competition (or, if the degree of competition is very low), firms will
produce below efficient output levels.
An SGV study (1992) reiterated the widely, accepted fact that the
Philippine industrial structure is characterized by a high degree of
seller [that is, production] concentration. The study offered three
explanations:
First, concentration may result because the size of the domestic
market is too small relative to the minimum efficient scale of
technology employed in some industries. If there is a bias against
exports, the saturation of the domestic market would leave no room
for the entrance of new firms. In this sense, economies of scale
themselves imply that the efficient industry is necessarily
concentrated.
Second, concentration may be the outcome of deliberate
government policy protecting and promoting some industries, such20 .9 Ma,Cristina S.Medilo
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as: traditional natural monopolies; industries which are subject to
explicit promotion programs; and "troubled" or"distressed" industries
which benefit from special government rehabilitation and
modernization programs.
Third, concentration may result from what is known as the
Schumpeterian process, which confers absolute advantages on an
innovating firm in the industry.This process implies that the driving
force behind truly dynamic efficiencies is not competition but the
achievement of economies of scale.
The study concludes that the high degree of seller concentration
in Philippine industry is due neither to the exploitation of economies
of scalenor to the Schumpeterian principle. Rather, it is the resuk of i
deliberate government policy protecting and promoting certain
industries, effectively setting up barriers to entry.
Thus, the deeper issueis not concentration per sebut the degree to
which incumbents are insulated from competition by entry barriers.
As Kirkpatrick and Maharaj (1992) put it, "even firms in a highly
concentrated industry may be driven to adopt competitive price and
output levels if there is an effective threat of entry from other firms."
In this sense, measures of concentration, or of the absence of
competitive pressure, may be understated if effective entry barriers are
ignored.
In his pathbreaking work, Bain (1956) considers asan entry barrier
anything that allowsincumbent firms to earnexcessprofits,that is,anything
that allowspricesto diverge fiom marginalcost.Thus, the presence of an
entry barrier easilysecures for the incumbents some degree of market
power,the latter being measured by the difference between output
price and marginal cost, that is,the price-costmargin.
It should be noted at this point that previous studies have found a
positive relationship between the price-cost margin and the
concentration ratio (see Cowling 1976, for example).
If markets are contestable, that is, if entry and exit barriers are
absent, and entrants can quickly replicate the cost structures of
incumbents (Frischtak 1989), the threat of entry would compel the
incumbents to behave like firms in a competitive market structure.
Competitive pressure can come from three sources (WB Report
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1) other producers in the domestic market (internal competition);
2) foreign producers selling in the domestic market (import
competition); and
3) foreign exporters competing with domestic exporters in third
markets.
For the purposes of this study, only the first and second sources are
relevant since the packaging industry is mainly import-substituting,
with direct exports accounting for only about 5 percent of total
industry output.
Competition may be posed either by existing firms or,in the case
of contestable markets, by potential entrants. In the Philippine
context, however, the presence of binding entry barriers renders some
industries in the domestic market uncontestable.
Bain (1956) cites three sources of entry barriers: (1) scale
economies; (2) absolute advantages; and (3) Product differentiation.
These arise because of the nature of the industrial structure itself and
as such are called structural barriers.
But barriers may also result from deliberate government
intervention protecting and promoting some firms or industries.
These policies may sometimes be prompted by genuine concern for
the ailing or retarded firm or industry.But sometimes, vested interests
are involved.
The SGV study (1992) has identified the entry barriers in the
Philippine industrial structure.
Policy-induced barriers take the following forms: direct restriction of
entrants, fiscal incentives, credit subsidies, bureaucratic requirements,
import restrictions and tariffs,and price or rate regulation.
Structural barriersto entry include: scale economies and excess
capacity,absolute advantages, high capital requirements and imperfect
capital markets, predatory or limit pricing, product differentiation and
brand loyalty, and incumbent reactions such as the use of the
regulatory orjudicial system to block competition.
The SGV study concludes that barriers to entry in Philippine
industries are generally policy-induced.
Given that entry barriers persist -- barring domestic competition
--another source of competitive pressure,imports, yet remains.Thus,22 41 Ma,CristinaS,Medilo
the import discipline hypothesis becomes the argument for trade
liberalization. This hypothesis posits that the mere threat of
competition, not necessarily actual competition, from imports can
force incumbents in a market characterized by high entry barriers to
alter their price and output decisions, resulting in efficiency gains
(Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992).
Following Helpman and Krugman (1985), the competitive effect
of trade on a market structure characterized by entry barriers may be
demonstrated using partial equilibrium analysis.This framework may
also be applied when trade levels increase due to the lowering of
protection.
Consider a single good produced in two countries with cost
functions C(w, x) and C*(w*, x), respectively. Assume that there are m
consumers in the first country, m* in the second, and that all of the
consumers have the same per capita demand function:
D =D(p).
Assume now that there is restricted entry into this industry
because of government regulations or other natural barriers. Instead,
there is a predetermined number of firms in both countries, n and n*.
In the absence of trade, the industry demand curve will be the
sum of individual demands, so that
X = Md(p),
where X is industry output.The inverse demand is
p = D-'(X/m) = D(X/m).
Firms are assumed to maximize profits and to take other firms'
outputs as given, implying the first-order condition that expresses the
equality of marginal cost to marginal revenue:
p + (x/m)D'[D(p)] = C(w,x),Packaging industry Ib 23
where x isthe output of arepresentative firm and C() isits marginal
cost. The left-hand side represents marginal revenue. But since all
firms are assumed alike
x = X/n = [Md(p)]/n
This yields the basic equilibrium condition:
p { 1- [1/ne(p)] } = C [_D(p)m/n]
where e(p)is the elasticity of demand. Price is greater than marginal
cost, denoting some degree of market power.
With the opening up of trade and under the assumption that the
countries are completely symmetric (that is,C(.) = C*(.); w = w'_;n =
n*), the marginal revenue of a representative firm becomes:
Mg =p{1- [1/(n+n *)e(p) ] }.
It is evident that at the pre-trade price, MR > C since the
elasticity of demand faced by a firm increasesJ This forces firms to
expand their output, consequently lowering the price. Thus, even if
no trade actually results -- the two countries being symmetric -- the
possibilityof trade,by increasing competition,has mattered.It has alteredthe
price and output behavioroffirms, creatinga more competitiveindustrial
structureandgeneratingefficiency gains.
If actual trade occurs, the degree of import competition may be
measured by the import penetration ratio, which is defined as the
proportion of imports to total domestic demand.
According to theWorld Bank (1991), an inverserelationship exists
between the import penetration ratio and the price-cost margin
which, as we have noted, is a measure of market power.This implies
that imports do exert a price-discipline effect on domestic producers.
2. In fact, under the more realistic small-country assumption, the elasticity of
demand approaches as the number of countries, and consequently, of firms,
increases.I
I
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It also appears that the largest reduction in price-cost margins
occurred in the highly-concentrated industries and in those with
relatively larger plant sizes,implying that these were the major gainers
in terms of the welfare effects of trade.The study also found that the
profits of large plants were the ones which experienced the greatest
reductions in the face of trade.Thus, import competition had its most
substantial effect on the rents being earned by the largest plants in the
domestic industry.
T'hese findings show that the welfare losses of uncompetitive
domestic markets may indeed be lessened by import competition.
The competitive effect of trade reform on the industrial structure
tnay be vitiated, however, by the behavioral reactions of the firms
themselves. For instance, the increase in imports may increase seller
[asopposed to production] concentration if major producers are also
importers (Kirkpatrick and Maharaj 1992). Moreover, the lower cost
of imported supplies may increase profitability if sellers can keep
domestic prices at their existing levels. Lobbying may also enable
domestic firms to influence the pattern and degree of implementation
of trade liberalization so as to leave their domestic rents largely
unaffected. In anyof these cases,the potential efIiciency gains resulting
from the competitive environment created by trade reform may not
be realized.4
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Data Sourcesand Methodology
THIschapter presents the data sources and the methodology used in
computing the various measures of protection, efficiency, and
productivity and the various indicators ofindustrial structure analyzed
in the study. Estimates at the subsector and industry levels are not
simple averages of plant-level estimates.These aggregate figures were
obtained by first summing up plant-level values for each component
of a given formula and plugging these aggregate values into the
formula. All computations were made using the Statistical Analysis
System (SAS) Package, version 5.
DATA SOURCES AND LIMITATIONS
Censusand otherPublishedData
As earliermentioned, the study_ main data basewas the 1983 and
1988 Census of Manufacturing Establishments. This data base
consisted of plant-level observations classified according to the
Philippine Standard Industry Ch-'_ification (PSIC) codes. Published
census data from various years were also consulted.
Tariffand tax rateswere obtained from various issues of the Tariff
and Customs Code of the Philippines and the National Internal
ILevenue Code, published by the Tariff Commission and the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, respectively. Export and import values were
taken from various issues of the ForeignTrade Statistics, published by
the NSO. Export ratios were computed based on data from the
3. The reader is referred to the 2-volume Development Incentive Assessment
Project Report for more details on the methodology used in the study.26 _1 Ma. Cristina S. Medilo
lnterindustryAccounts of the Philippines (Input-Output Tables), also
published by the NSO.
Survey Questionnaire,Interviews,Plant Visits,and Consultations
The survey questionnaire covers the years 1986 and 1991. It
consists of six parts: (1) general information about the plant, (2)
production technology, (3) human resources, (4) financial resources,
(5) research and development, and (6)policy environment.
Of the 100 questionnaires sent to plants in the different subsectors,
only 14 were retrieved.And since none of the retrieved questionnaires
was completely answered, financial statements of the concerned
respondents were obtained from the Securities and Exchange
Commission to serve as asupplementary data base.
Interviews with industry sources also form an integral part of the
data base.These were conducted mostly during plant visits.The study
also utilized exchanges with management-level representatives from
producing and end-using firms during consultative meetings held in




Trade liberalization, through tariff reform and import
deregulation, is expected to create amore open and outward-oriented
trade regime by lowering the high protection levels created by past
protectionist policies. Changes in these levels are usually measured
using the concept of the effective protection rate (EPR).
The EPR is defined as thepercentage excessofdomesticvalueadded[at
protectedprices]overworldvalueadded[atfreetradeorborder prices,that is,in
the absenceof protection](Tariff Commission undated). Value added is
simply the difference between the value of output and the
corresponding value of inputs used (both net of salestaxes).Packaging Industry I_ 27
Under a restricted trade regime, domestic prices exceed world
prices due to protective devices such as tariffs,advance sales taxes on
imports, mark-ups, and other non-tariff or quantitative trade barriers.
Hence, the difference between domestic and world value added.The
EPR. measures the levels through which the protection structure raises
an industry's or aplant's value added per unit over the world market
value added, as expressed in the following formula:
EPR = DVA - FTVA , 100 FTVA
 1,oo LFTVA
where DVA = domestic value added
FTVA = free trade value added
Based on the definition of value added, the formula becomes:
pQ - RM
(1+s/ (I+Q EPR= -1 , 100
PQ _
(I +r) (I+r)
where PQ = value of production
RM = cost of material inputs used
s. = sales tax on output
J (usedto deflate the value of production into domestic
ex-factory terms) .,
si = sales tax on input
(used to deflate the cost of material inputs into
domestic ex-factory terms)
T. = implicit tariff on output
J
(used to deflate the value of production into free
trade terms)
T= = implicit tariff on inputs28 _1 Ma,Cristina S.Medilo
(used to deflate the cost of material inputs into free
trade terms)
The implicit tarifl_used in the study are based only on tariffs and
taxes.The resulting EPlks thus do not take quantitative restrictions
and other non-tariffmeans of protection into account.
The Census data do not directly provide information on the value
of production. PQ was,thus, obtained by adding total revenue to the
change in inventories of finished goods and work-in-process. Only 50
percent of work-in-process inventory was considered part of total
production; the other half was assumed to have undergone very little
processing.
The other item necessary for computing value added is the
material input cost, RM, which was taken directly from the Census
data.
Net EffectiveProtection Rate (NEPR)
The measure of effective protection discussed above indicates the
relative incentives given to different subsectors. It focuses on the
relative position of subsectors Or plants in the EPR. scale since
"protection isa relativeconcept" (Tan 1979). High protection in some
subsectors implies low protection in others. If all subsectors were
highly protected, no particular subsector or group ofsubsectors would
then be effectively protected. However, Tan stresses that, as a whole,
tradeable goods may be penalized relative to non-tradeables by an
overvalued currency or can be protected by an undervalued currency.
Thus, the EPR estimates which are computed at the actual
exchange rate can be adjusted for theextentofovervaluation of thecurrency
(which is the usual case) as compared to the hypothetical free trade
situation to yield the netEPR, asfollows:
NEPR = -OER (EPR + I) I - I
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where NEPR = net effective protection rate
OER = official exchange rate
FTER = free trade exchange rate
ImplicitTariff
Implicit tariffsare, in principle, the proportional differencebetween
domestic prices and the borderprices of homogeneous goods (Tariff
Commission undated). This difference occurs because of various
protective devices, such as tariffs, taxes, and import restrictions. If
protection due only to tariff and taxes isto be estimated, the formula
for computing implicit tariffs is asfollows:
T= [(1 + t) (1 + s)]- 1
where T = implicit tariff
t = book or nominal tariff
S = sales tax
AverageImplicitTariffonImportables(T)
The formula cited above is applicable when implicit tariffs on
particular commodities are to be estimated.The aggregated nature of
the Census of Establishments data, however, does not permit the
computation of implicit tariff on particuhr products. Neither does it
allow the estimation of plant,level implicit tarif_ which requires
detailed information on the products manufactured by each plant.
Nonetheless, implicit tariffs at the level of the subsector can be
computed based on Census data since the PSICs falling under each
subsector, and their corresponding PSCC lines, can be identified.
To estimate the implicit tariff applicable to a subsector, the
formula above wasmodified. Instead of valuesfor aparticular product,
the components of the basic formula for estimating implicit tariff
now represent aggregated subsector figures:30 _1 Ma Cristina S Medilo
T = implicit tariff for the subsector
t = average nominal tarifffor the subsector
s = average sales tax for the subsector
Based on these modifications, implicit tariffs for 1988 were
estimated as follows,
First, the PSCC lines (or products) falling under each subsector
were identified. These PSCC lines were segregated into those
representing finished goods and those representing material inputs
since separate implicit tariffs were to be calculated for outputs and
inputs.The nominal or book tariffrates corresponding to the different
PSCC lines were then taken from various issues of the Tariff and
Customs Code of the Philippines and their simple average computed.
The same procedure was employed in computing the average sales
tax for the subsector.The computed average tariffand sales tax were
then plugged into the formula to obtain the implicit tariff for the
subsector.
AverageImplicitTariffonImportables and Exportables(T)
Although exports are usually assumed tariff-free, implicit tariffs
on output and inputs which cover both exp0rtables and importables
may be estimated. This measure, denoted by Tj or T_ for outputs and
inputs, respectively, is considered more precise than the average
implicit tariff on importables presented above since it reflects the
weights proper to the two components of trade. The formula for
obtaining T is asfollows: J
T = Domesticvalueof output 1
Border(freetrade)valueof output
since PQ ,kx + PQ _,(l-x) = PQ
1+0 I+Tj
where PQ = domestic value of output, obtained as previously
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x = export ratio, computed from the input-output tables
T. = average subsectorimplicit tariffon import substitute, J
obtained aspreviously explained
PQb = border value of output
and 0 is the tariffon exports.
Dividing everything by PQ, adding, and rearranging, we obtain:







as defined. T_was similarly derived.
The average implicit tariffs computed based on these formulas
will yield values that are more consistent with the computed EPR
values, aswill be shown in Chapter 6.
Do/nestic Resource Cost (DRC): DRC at Shadow Prices
The DRC is a cost-ben_t ratiorepresenting the socialvaluationof
domesticresourcesusedper unit of.foreignexchangeearned(orsaved)by the
export(orimportsubstitution)ofagivenproduct(Bautista andPower 1979).
In general, the formula for estimating DRC is represented by:
DR C = Domesticcostin shadowprices
Bordervalueof output- Foreigncostin border prices
= Socialvalueofdomesticresources (in P)
Socialvalueofnetforeign exchangeearnedorsaved(in$)32 _1 Ma, Cristina S. Medilo
Lower DR.C values for a particuhr product [plant, or industry]
will benefit the economy since it implies that value added at
international prices is maximized for a given input of domestic
resources allocated to the production of the tradeable good [or the
operation of the phnt or industry producing the good] (Page 1980).
As a cost-benefit measure, the DRC ratio expressed in shadow or
social prices and in terms of net foreign exchange earned or saved is
particularly useful in less developed countries (LDCs) characterized
by (1) highly distorted markets and (2)the scarcity of foreign
exchange.
In a world of distortions arising from genuine market failures
(increasing returns, imperfect competition) and/or created b3/
government policy intervention (price controls, protectionist trade
policies, state trading), market prices do not reflect the true social
costs and benefits of goods and resources (Tariff Commission
undated). The DRC measure corrects for these distortions by valuing
output and factors of production (including foreign exchange) at
shadow or accounting prices.The shadowpriceof an item is defined as
the social[asopposed to private] valueof endowingtheprivatesectorwith
onemoreunit ofit (Tower 1992).
Since the DlLC expresses social domestic cost in terms of an
additional unit of net forei_,n exchange earned or saved, it explicitly
treats foreign exchange as a scarce resource, thus reflecting the
situation prevalent in most small open LDCs like the Philippines. It
indicates the priceor the costofforeignexchange.Thehigher the cost, the
more unfavorable the production activity utilizing domestic resources
to generate or save foreign exchange. Logically, then, the common
benchmark used in determining the maximum DR.C still socially
profitable is theshadow exchangerate(SELL). More specifically,the ratio
of the DlLC to the SELL,DRC/SER, is used to measure allocative
_iciet,.cyand comparative advantage.
For the purposes of this study,apositive DRC/SER ratio lessthan
or equal to 1.2 is taken to indicate allocative efficiency and
comparative advantage. The excess of 20 percent over the more
commonly used benchmark of 1.0 is an allowance for computational
errors. A DRC/SElL ratio between 1.2 and 1.5 is taken to indicatePackaging Industry _ 33
mild inefficiency, while a ratio greater than 1.5 is considered to
indicate inefficiency. A negative DRC value indicates negative net
foreign exchange earning or saving.This means that the border value
of the output generated by the activity in question is not enough to
cover the free trade foreign cost of the activity, not to mention the
corresponding domestic costs.
The DRC may be used in an ex antesense to rank hypothetical
projects. In the ex postsense, however, it may be used to evaluate past
or existing trade and industrial policies.The present study will use the
DRC to measure the cost of resource misallocation arising from the
past protectionist trade regime and to assess possible changes in
resource allocation after the implementation of the TLP.
Although some adjustments had to be made to suit data available
for aparticular year,the basicmethod used for estimating DRCs based
on data from the Census of Manufacturing Establishments is as
follows.
First, the elements constituting the three major components of
the DR_C formula (domestic cost, foreign cost, and value of output)
were determined.The major components of cost are:
1) interest and depreciation costs of fixed assets;
2) interest cost on working capital;
3) cost of material inputs and supplies;
4) labor cost; and
5) other domestic costs.
Other foreign costs are not included in the Census data.
Interestand DepreciationCostsof FixedAssets
Fixed assets include buildings, machines, transportation
equipment, and other assets such as furniture, fixtures, and office
equipment. Land was excluded from the computations since most of
the establishments did not report land value.
In computing the interest and depreciation costs of fixed assets,
the following notations were used:34 _ Ma,Cristina S,Medilo
N = useful life of the asset; specific to the type of asset and the
subsector
Y = year when the asset was acquired
CY = current year, or the year for which the DRC is being
computed
K = age of the asset as of the current year
PI = price index inflator
PI¥ = price index of the year when the asset was acquired
Plcv = price index of the current year
1 = shadow interest rate for the current year
g = productivity growth rate of the asset
D = depreciation cost charged against the asset per year
BV = book value of the asset at the end of the current year
R.C = replacement cost of the fixed asset
IC = computed interest cost of the asset
DC = computed depreciation cost of the asset





PI = PIcyI PIy
RC = (N ,_D) _ PI if BV > OandK > O
(1 +g)K
The replacement cost of an asset may be computed only if its
book value, BV, and its computed age, K, were both positive. The
price index inflator, PI, considered inflation in the capital asset while
the productivity deflator,g, took into account the offsetting increase
in the productivity of the asset.These two adjustments had to be made
'because rapid inflation outstripped growth in productivity beginningPackaging Industry I_ 35
1970.The productivity growth rate was assumed to be 3 percent for
alltypes of assetsand for the all the reference years.
The interest and depreciation costs of fixed assets were then
computed from the replacement cost, asfollows:
IC =RC,i ifBV>OandK>O
DC = RC if B V > 0 and K-> 0
N_1.5
In computing for depreciation cost, the replacement cost of the
asset was deflated by the product of its useful life and a factor of 1.5,
based on the assumption that the economic life of an asset is usually
longer than its reported accounting life.
After computing the interest and depreciation costs, the next task
was to determine the proportions that would be considered domestic
and foreign.To segregate the domestic from the foreign component,





Transportation equipment 0.85 0.15




Transportation equipment 0.20 0.80
Other fixed assets 0.15 0.85
These ratios are based on the assumptions made regarding the
sources of financial capital -- to which the interest cost would accrue
n and the sources of physical assets-- to which the depreciation cost
would accrue. It was assumed that much of financial capital is sourced
locally whereas physical capital, except for buildings, is imported.
Thus, at least 85 percent of the interest cost of all assetswas assumed36 _1 Ma.Cristina S.Medilo
domestic, while at least 80 percent of depreciation cost, except that of
buildings, was considered foreign.
To correct the distortions due to the domestic tax system and to
fully convert the computed costs into shadow values, the domestic
component of interest and depreciation costs of each type of fixed
assetwas deflated by one plus the sales tax (VATin 1988).The foreign
component was deflated by the official exchange rate (OER.)
multiplied by one plus the appropriate implicit tariff on the fixed
asset,to express it in borders terms.
InterestCostonWorkingCapital
Working capital consists of the inventories of material inputs,
work-in-process, and finished goods.To estimate the interest cost on
working capital,an average inventory level based on a simple average
of beginning and ending inventory levelswasfirst computed separately
for finished goods and material inputs. Fifty percent of work-in-
process was considered part of finished goods; the other half was
assumed to have undergone very little processing and was thus
included in the material inputs inventory.
The interest cost on working capital was obtained by applying the
shadow interest rate to the computed average inventories. These
computed interest costs were then broken down into their domestic
(15 percent) and foreign (85 percent) components and divided by the
appropriate deflators to convert them into domestic ex-factory and
free trade terms.
Costof MaterialInputsand Supplies
Material inputs include both the major and minor material inputs
used in the manufacture of the product. Supplies constitute packaging
materials, office supplies, fuel, gasoline, electricity, water, and other
utilities. The Census-based value of each of these items was broken
down into its domestic and foreign components according to the
following allocation ratios:Packaging Industry b, 37
.... .4 ......................... ** ......... ** ....... ''*** .... **** ....
Domestic Foreign





Packaging materials 0.10 0.90
Office supplies 0.15 0.85
Water 1.00 0.00
Electricity 1.00 0.00
Other non-tradeable utilities 1.00 0.00
Lubricants 0.00 1.00
Diesel 0.00 1.00
Fuel and gasoline 0.00 1.00
LPG 0.00 1.00
Bunker fuel 0.00 1.00
Coal 0.00 1.00
Other purely importable utilities 0.00 1.00
The computed domestic and foreign cost components were then
divided by the appropriate deflators to express them in ex-factory and
free trade tertm.
LaborCost
Labor costs comprise basic salaries and wages and overtime pay,
but do not include contributions to government or private insurance
institutions and other benefits.
Actual labor costs of unskilled workers were adjusted since the
market wage rate of unskilled workers isusually lower than their true
marginal productivities. Thus,
SWU = I,_WU
where SWU = shadow wage rate of unskilled workers
1 = assumed factor to convert the market wage rate into
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WU = market wage rate of unskilled workers.
The market wages of skilled laborers were not adjusted since it
may be assumed that their market wage rates already reflect their true
marginal productivities. The total domestic social cost of labor is the
sum of the shadow labor cost of skilled and unskilled workers.
Other Domestic Costs
Other domestic costs include industrial and non-industrial
services done by others. Subsidies are also considered asdomestic costs
because these constitute social costs to society.These costs were not
deflated because the proper tax deflators could not be determined.
Valueof Output
Value of output wascomputed using the same method asthat used
in EPR_ estimation. This was divided into the exported and
domestically-sold components (import substitutes) using an export
ratio computed from the lnput-Outptat tables.The domestically-sold
portion was then deflated by the official exchange rate multiplied by
one plus the implicit tariff, to express it in border or free trade terms.
The exported component was deflated only by the official exchange
rate since exports are assumed tarifF- and tax-fi:ee.
All costswere thus evaluated at social opportunity cost. Domestic
costs (in the numerator) were expressed in peso values.The value of
output aswell asallforeign costs (in the denominator) were expressed
in free trade terms and converted into dollar values.
DR C at Market Prices(DRCM)
To measure competitive advantage, another D1KC measure was
computed based on market prices (denoted by DRCM, where M
signifies market, instead of shadow prices). The latter is essentially
similar to the former except that all the items in its numerator were
not deflated by sales taxes and converted into domestic ex-factoryPackaging Industry Ip 39
terms. Moreover, the cost of unskilled labor was not converted into its
shadow value in the computation of DRCM.
Because of the modifications given to convert DRC into DILCM,
it is evident that D1LCM/OER. will always be higher than DlLC/
SER. That is, a socially low-cost enterprise (low DILC/SEtL ratio)
may appear high cost in the market (high DILCM/OER ratio). Such
is the case because the numerator of DlLC is deflated while that of
DtLCM is not. Also, the SER is usually higher than the official
exchange rate. Thus, an industry or a plant which has comparative
advantage (with a low DILC/SEP,. ratio) may appear uncompetitive
(since DILCM/OEIL is always higher than DR.C/SEIL) in the
domestic and international markets because of distortions (that is, in
the tax system, wage structure, and exchange rate regime).
Technical EfficiencyCo_cient (TEC)
A plant is considered technically efficientif it producesthe maximum
quantity of output attainable from agiven bundleof inputs (Farrell 1957).
Most studies use Farrell's (1957) frontier production function
approach to measuring technical efSciency. It involves estimating a
frontier or "best practice" production function which is thought to
represent the maximum achievable output for any given level of
inputs. When the maximum output is known, it is possible to
construct an index of technical efficiency using the ratio between
actualoutput and the maximum attainableor potentialoutput derived
from the frontier model.That is,with a given bundle of inputs and a
given state of technology,
Technical efficiency = actualoutput
potentialoutput
Several methods of estimating the production frontier have been
proposed. The two most prominent ones are the deterministic and
stochastic models. The deterministic model attributes the difference
between actual and potential output wholly to symmetric random
disturbances. That is, it does not isolate the proportion of the40 41 Ma. Cfistina S, Medilo
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difference between actual and potential output which is due to
inefficiency from other random disturbances. The stochastic model,
on the other hand, explicitly includes an efficiency component in the
error term of the estimated production function to isolate the
difference between actual and potential output due only to efficiency
factors. Thus, estimates from stochastic models are considered more
accurate than estimates from deterministic models. However, the
statistical package for estimating technical efficiency using the
stochastic model could not run on available data.The study thus used
a deterministic linear programming model using the SAS package.
The model employed, taken from Page (1980), simply minimizes
the deviations of actual output from the maximum potential output,
subject to some constraints. It sets out a translog production function
which• is used to represent the "best practice" frontier.
The linear programming problem was set up asfollows:
Min Y- Y,
where
Ye = _ + otLln L + ott,: InK + otMln M
+ ot_ln L InK + _t._In Lln M + O_r,.Mln Kin M
+ 1/20tu. (InL)e + 1/2 otra ¢(InK)2+ 1/2 ot_ (InAll) 2
subject to the following constraints:
(i) aL+a K+as, = i
(ii) au< + eLM+ a,, = 0
OCra " +(Xr. _ ,+ O_KK = 0
O_Mz" + O_MK + O_MM = 0
(iii)aLL_<o
_:K -< 0
a_._--< 0Packaging Industry I_ 41
where
Y = estimated maximum potential output
Y = value of actual output, computed in the same manner as in
the DtLC estimation
L = total number of man-hours
K = user cost of capital
M = cost of material inputs
The above problem produces a set of coefficients which describe the
frontier production function.
Technical efficiency is thus measured asfollows:
Technical = Y__
Eae,,o,
This ratio, caUed the technicaleffkiency co_l_cient(TEC), simply
denotes the extent to which a plant is able to achieve the maximum
potential output given its choice of technique.
A separate function was constructed for each of the four
subsectors. No function was constructed for the entire packaging
industry because the technologies employed in the different subsectors
are quite different and cannot be represented by one industry
production function. TEC estimates were, thus, obtained only at the
plant and subsector levels.
The import discipline hypothesis predicts that trade liberalization
will improve the technical efficiency level in local industries and
individual plants since they will be induced to use their inputs more
efficiently to compete successfully with imports.
IndustrialStructureIndicators
Two aspects of the industrial structure are discussed in this paper
m concentration and barriers to entry. As defined in the preceding
chapter, concentration refers to the extent to whichan economicactivityis42 ,q Ma.Cristina. S.Medilo
dominatedbyafew largefirms[i.e.,plants, in thisstudy] (Lee 1992).Also,
the measures of concentration used in the study indicate production
rather than seller -- concentration since imports and exports are
not taken into account. An entry barrier,on the other hand, is defined
to be anythingthatallowsincumbentsto earnexcesspr_ts (Bain 1956).
The measures of concentration used in the study are: the value
addedconcentration ratio-4(VACR-4) and the Herfindahl index. VACR-
4 refers to the shareof thefour largest plants in totalindustry orsubsector
CVA, The He_ndahl index (H),on the other hand, refers to the sumof




where s_ = share of the ith plant to total subsector or industry
value added.
Thus, while taking into account the shares of all the plants in the
subsector or industry, the Herfindahl index properly weighs the shares
of large and small players. It is thus considered superior to VACR.-4.
This index is compared with the ratio 1/n, where r_is the number of
plants in the industry or subsector. The ratio 1/n represents the
perfectly competitive concentration ratio where the plants in the
industry or subsector allhave equal shares.The higher theHerflndahl
index relative to the ratio 1/n, the less competitive -- or the more
concentrated -- the subsector.
The indicators of entry barriers used in the study are the price-
cost margin and the minimum efficient scale.By definition, the price-
costmarginis the excessofpriceOver marginalcost,expressedas aproportion
ofprice- that is,
PCM = P- MC
P
Since it is usually difficult to estimate marginal cost, other
measures are used to estimate price-cost margins. A commonly used
formula (Lindsey 1977) is:Packaging Industry IP 43
PCM = Census valueO.ddcd _ Compensation
Valueof Output
The difference between value addedand compensation represents
payments to factors other than labor, which roughly represents the
profitability of an enterprise. The higher this figure, the higher the
market power exercised by a plant or a subsector.
Another measure of entry barriers used in the study is the
minimum efficient scale (MES). The minimum gfflcientscale for a
subsector is defined as the ratioof the averageCVA ofthe largestplants
accounting for thefirst 50 percentof totalsubsectorCVA, to totalsubsector
C VA.That is,
I AverageCVA oflargestplants acc.ountingfor
IVIES = first 50% oftotalsubsectorCVA
TotalsubsectorC VA
As discussed in the previous chapter, economies of scale can act as a
barrier to entry.
MeasuresofFactorProductivityand FactorUse
Measures of factor productivity compare some indicatorof output
with the amount ofinpu t used.
Capitalproductivitywas measured as the ratioof censusvalueaddedto
the totalstock of capitalvalued at replacement cost.Value added was
converted into constant 1972 prices using the grossdomestic product
(GDP) deflator for the manufacturing sector, while rephcement cost
was adjusted using the deflatorfor.capital goods.The rephcement cost
of capital used was the value obtained from the DILC computations.
The formula for estimating capital productivity is:
Capital Productivity = CensusValue Added
Capital Stockat ReplacementCost44 4 Ma. Cristina S. Medilo
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Laborproductivityrepresents the ratio of censusvalueadded to total
employment,or
LaborProductivity = CensusValue Added
NumberofWorkers
The capital-labor ratio,Or capitalintensity,represents the ratioof the
totalstock ofcapitalvalued at replacement cost (also at constant 1972
prices) to totalemployment,or
CapitalIntensity = Capitalstockat replacement cost
Numberofworkers
Factor productivity is expected to increase with trade
liberalization, for the same reasonsthat efficiency is also expected to
rise.Plants would be induced by competitive pressure to use factors
more efficiently. However, observed improvements in factor
productivity mayonly+bedue to improvements in capacity utilization.
Since data on capacity utilization were not avaihble, however, this
aspect could not be verified.
Trade-RelatedIndicators
Trade liberalization isexpected to increase the volume of trade.To
assesschanges in the industry's degree of openness •to trade between
1983 and 1988, the study used the export ratio •and the import
penetration rate.
Export ratiorefersto the shareofexportsto totaldomestic production.It
refers to direct exports alone, since indirect packaging exports,
although constituting a significafit portion of total exports in the
industry, could not be properly measured.The importpenetrationrate,
on the other hand, represents the proportionofimportsto totaldomestic
demand,that is,to total domestic production plus imports, less exports.Packaging indus_y _ 45
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Export ratio = Exports
Domestic production
Import penetration rate = Imports
Domestic production + Imports - Exports5





PACKAGING may be defined asthe totalityofproducts, iservices, andsystems
usedtopreparegoodsforpreservation,transport,distribution,storage, retailing,
and consumption(Philexport 1993). It maypefforml any or all of these
functions: (1) containment and protection; (2) information and
marketability; and (3) transportation and storage.
Classificationof PackagingProducts
Packaging products may be classified in different ways. One
classification refersto the manner through which these are used:as a
primary, secondary,or tertiary package (Philexpor i 1993).Another is
based on end-use: consumer, industrial/transport/bulk, or military.




In terms of the PSIC scheme, packaging firms fall under the
following industry codes:48 _ Ma. Cristina S. Medilo
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34120 Paper and paperboard container manufacturing
35609 Manufacture of plastic products, n. e. c.
36202 Manufacture of glasscontainers
38131 Manufacture of tin containers
38139 Manufacture of metal containers, n. e. c.
The industry also comprises other groups of players:raw material
and equipment suppliers; firms from end-using industries;
government agencies involved in the industry; and various industry
associations and other organizations linked to the industry (Philexport
1992).
Number of Establishments4
•The number of plants operating in the industry nearly doubled
between 1983 and 1988, asudden rise in the otherwise stable number
of establishments since 1972. In 1988, 408 establishments, or 4
percent of the manufacturing total, were engaged in the manufacture
of packaging products. Of these, 64 percent belonged to the plastic-
based subsector. Paper- and metal-based packaging manufacturers
made up 20 percent and 13 percent of the total, respectively.The
remaining 3 percent consisted of the 10glasscontainer manufacturers.
4. The figures reported in this and the following sections cover the PSICs cited
above. A careful examination of plant-level product codes in 1988 revealed,
however, that some plants classified under PSIC 35609 were not actualy engaged in
the manufacture of packaging products. Moreover, a few plants under PSICs 34230
and 35603 (covering commercial and job printing and and plastic industrial
supplies, respectively, which were not included in the original data set) were
engaged in packaging production. The time-series presentation of these sections
could thus have been made more accurate with these adjustments. However, a
parallel identification of the product codes corresponding to each plant in the
'critical' PSICs could not be made for 1972 and 1983 due to data constraints.
Hence. the study simply utilized the data covered by the aforementioned PSICs for
consistency.Packaging Industry b. 49
Valueof Outputs
In 1988, total industry output amounted to P1,575,557, 3.4
percent of total manufacturing output. This amount!represented 33
percent more than 1983 output and more than twice the output in
1972. Of the four subsectors, the plastic-based Igroup, which
accounted for 44 percent of industry output in 1988, consistently
registered the largest share in the industry total throughout the period
1972-1988. The paper-based subsector made up 22!percent; while
the glass- and metal-based subsectors each accountedifor 17 percent.
Employment Size
The industry employed a total of 30,439 workers, around 3.5
percent of the manufacturing total, in 1988. This represents a 54
percent increase over its 1972 employment size and a 3 percent gain
over the 1983 total.
The plastic-based subsector accounted for half Of total industry
employment in 1988, followed by metal container Ifabricators (19
percent), paper converters (18 percent), and the glass,based subsector
(13 percent).
5. Value is in constant 1972 prices. Industry sources claim that these figures
understate the actual size of the packaging industry. Several multinational
companies and local fruit exporters produce their own tin cans and paperboxes the
value of which is never reported to the NSO under the packaging-rehted PSICs.
Another important omission is the value ofpaper-hased packages used by cigarette
companies. There are the so-called 'backyard operators' whose production data arc
not recorded. For these reasons, the paper-based subsector supposedly accounted
for the largest share in the industry output in 1988, followea:lby the metal-based
group. The actual figures could not be determined, however, since the firms
concerned refrained from fi_rnishing the necessary data.50 4 Ma,Cristina S.Mediio
ValueAdded Contribution to GDI_
The industry's census value added (CVA) rose by 74 percent from
1972 to 198.3 and by 31.4 percent from 1983 to 1988.The industry
CVA of P541,285,000 accounted for 3.3 percent of total
manufacturing CVA in 1988.
The plastic-based group posted the largest share (40 percent) of
total industry CVA in 1988. Although it had the least number of
plants, the glass-based group accounted for the second largest CVA
(31 percent) because it had the least production costs.The paper- and
metal-based subsectors made up 15percent and 14 percent of industry
CVA in 1988, respectively.
Geographical Location
In 1988, around 85 percent of the plants in the industry were located
in the National Capital Region (NCR.) (a sharp increase from 1983's
79 percent), with Quezon and Caloocan cities each accounting for
around 40 percent of the establishments in the region. The primary
reason for this concentration is the NCR's proximity to major
markets. Roughly 7 percent were situated in CentralVisayas (Cebu);
the rest of the plants were dispersed in the 'Southern Tagalog, Central
Luzon, and Mindanao regions.
Direct Exports of Finished Goods
Direct exports of packaging products amounted to P681.3 M
(FOB, at P21,0947/$) in 1988, a 3 percent gain over that of 1983.
The glass-based subsector posted the biggest export share in 1988 (79
percent), followed by the metal- (12 percent) and paper-based (8
6. Valueisin constant1972prices.Asindicatedin the censusofManufacturing
Establishments, CVArepresents the valueofoutput,net oftotalproductionand
other ;'ostswhich include:materials,supplies,and fuelconsumed,electricity
purchased,contract work and industrialservicesdone by others,and goods
purchased forresale.Packaging industry I_ 51
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percent) subsectors. Exports of plastic-based containers constituted
less than 1 percent of the industry total.
The share of exports to total industry output in 1988 was only 7
percent, a slight gain from 1983's 2 percent. However, this figure was
computed from available input-output data at the two-digit level of
disaggregation and, thus, may not reflect the exact export ratio of the
packaging industry7
Importsof FinishedGoods
Imports of finished packaging goods in 1988 (P672.6 M, CIF)
gained 20 percent over the 1983 figure.These imports consisted of
metal containers (58 percent), glassbottles (30 percent), paper-based
(10 percent) packaging goods, and plastic containers (2 percent).
The industry import penetration ratio fell from 10 percent in
1983 to 8 percent in 19887 Only that of the phstic-based subsector
increased (from 2 to 9 percent). Ratios for the metal-Iand paper-based
subsectors decreased (from 23 to 8 percent, and from 7 to 6 percent,
respectively). The ratio for the glass-based group slightly increased
(from 8 to 9 percent).
Importsof PackagingRaw MaLerials
The plastic-based subsector imported the most raw materials,
accounting for 66 percent of total industry imports (P672,619,044,
7. Moreover, industry sources claim that these export figures are understated since
they do not include d_elarge volume of indirect exports, particuhrly of corrugated
cartons and sanitized tin cans, used by multinationals exporting fresh and processed
fruits and dairy products. This claim is Supported by the fact that the share of
packaging to the total product cost of processed foods can run from 28 to 70
percent. In view of these, the reported relative shares of the different subsectors in
the total packaging exports areconsidered inaccurat_ Metal containers supposedly
topped the list of packaging exports in 1988.
8. Domestic demand equals domestic production plus imports minus exports.
These ratios nuv not reflect the exact shares of the packaging subsectors, since they
were taken from imput-output data at the two-digit level ofdisaggregation.52 _i Ma. CristinaS. Medilo
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CIF) in 1988.This is because only two of its five major raw materials,
polystyrene (PS) and polyvinyl chloride (PVC), are locally
manufactured. Moreover, industry sources say that local PVC is not
food grade, which explains why the plastic-based subsector imports
around 80 percent to 90 percent of its raw material requirements.The
paper-, metal-, and glass-based subsectors accounted for 24 percent, 8
percent, and 2 percent of raw material importations in 1988.
Structure
The Philippine packaging industry typifies the dualistic market
structure usually found in LDCs, which is characterized by the co-
existence of an o!igopohstic core (a few large plants dominating the
market in terms of sales, employment, and value added) and a
competitive fringe (a large number of smallplants accounting for but
a small percentage of industry sales,employment, and value added)
(P,.odrik 1988b).
In 1988, 77 percent of plants in the industry belonged• to the
small-scale category (Table 3).9(Small-scalerefers to plants employing.
5 to 99 workers; the Census data set does not include plants with less
than fiveworkers.) Medium-scale establishments (employing 100-199
workers) and large-scale plants (employing more than 200 workers)
made up only 11 and 12 percent of the total. Among the subsectors,
only the ghss-based group consisted mostly oflarge plants.The rest all
had smaU-scaleplants in the majority.
9. The number of plants reported here does not tally with thefigure cited earlier
under the section on Number of establishments, which represents the sum ofaU the
plants under the five covered PSICs.The adjustments mentioned under that section
were incorporated in the 1988 portion of the present tabulation. Hence, the smaller,
yet more accurate, number of plants reported here.The 1983 data was not adjusted,
• howe_er, due to the unavailability of plant-level product code data. This imphes a
certain asymmetry between the 1§83 and 1988 data sets, which is deemed not too
serious to distort the analysis since the adjustments on 1988 data were made mainly
for the..plastic-based subsector. Only four plants from PSIC 34230 were added to
the 1988 data base for the paper-based subsector.m
TaMe3




Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
,<
Glass-based 0 1 7 8 2 1 6 9
#
Metal-based 21 3 10 34 35 8 8 51
Paper-based 34 5 4 43 69 7 8 84
Plastic-based 62 17 13 92 108 15 12 136
IndusW 117 26 34 177 214 31 34 279
*Size relmto_)enur_ber ofemployed wod_m:
Smell : 5- 99
Medium• 100-199
Source ofbaJic da_:Census olManulacludng Embli_ment_
CO54 _1 Ma.Cristina S.Medilo
The sharp polarization between plants in the upper and lower
ends of the industry spectrum is evident in the differences in
technology employed, training of technical personnel, product quality,
and prices charged by the firms. Competition in terms of product
quality and variety is generally keener among the larger phnts catering
mostly to multinational corporations. Prices are generally high since
quality fetches a corresponding price. However, price differences
increasingly become the basis of competition toward the industry's
tail-end.
Although entry into the lower end of the spectrum is relatively
free, barriers m usually in the form of huge capital requirements and
scale economies -- inhibit possible entrants from getting into the
upper end. Between 1983 and 1988, for instance, the proportion of
small-scale phnts to the industry total increased from 66 to 77 percent,
which may mean that the risein the number of plants wasdue mainly
to the entrance of small-scale concerns.The proportion of medium-
and large-scale plants to the industry total correspondingly fell
between the two years.The same trend is apparent at the subsector
level.
Although the number of small plants increased during the two
years, the total census value added of phnts belonging to this size
category declined (Table 4). In contrast, the total census value added
of large plants increased despite the drop in the proportion of large
plants to the industry total. Medium-sized plants showed minimal
changes.
The preceding pattern of CVA shares reflects the high degree of
production concentration in the industry. In 1988, subsectorVACR.-
4 ratios clustered around 48 percent, with the exception of the glass-
based group which had an even higherVACR.-4 of 96 percent (Table
5).
Another measure of concentration used is the Herfindahl index
(Table 5).This index is compared with the ratio I/n, where n is the
number of plants in the industry or subsector. The higher the
Herfindahl index relative to the ratio 1/n, the less competitive -- or







Small* Medium** Large*** Small* Medium** Large***
Glass-based 0 20,003,025 237,417,141 8,908,080 3,1S3,064 1,290,149,397
Metal-based 155,291.548 12,992,602 141,946,481 38,120,913 84,954,308 157,188,474
Paper-based 18,927,900 61,811,916 67.817,071 53,064,178 117,994,564 307,104,179
Plastic-based 93,839,457 93,258,219 202,250,661 415,898.753 148.875,209 365,174,578
Industry 268,058,906 188,055,762 649,431,354 515,981,923 354,977,145 2,119,616,628
* Plants wilhS- 99workers
** Ptantswith 100-tggworkers
*** Plants with 200workers ormore
Source ofba._c data: Census 01Manufaclunng Establi_rnefts.
: c.
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Table 5
Measures ofSeller ConcentraUon bySubsector:. 1983 and 1
4-Plant Concentration Ratio Heffindahl index
(%) (%)
1983 1988 1983 1988
Glass.based 90 96 25 (12.5) 35 (11)
Metal-based 71 45 30 (3) 8 (2)
Paper-based 64 51 13 (2) 9 (1)
Plastic-based 38 47 5 (1) 8 (0.7)
Notes : 4-Plant Concentration Ratios and Herflndahl Indices are based on value added.
Figures Inparentheses represent 1In ratios.
Sourceof basicdata:CensusofManufacturing Establishments,
i i ii i i ii ii ii
Comparing the subsector indices with their respective 1/n ratios
(Table 6), it is easy to see that all the subsectors were concentrated,
particularly the glass-based subsector.
The study used the price-cost margin and the minimum efficient
scale to determine the presence of entry barriers. Based on the price-
cost margin, only the glass-based subsector appears to have been
characterized by high entry barriers in 1988. Despite its attractive
high price-cost margin (Table 6), the number of players in this
subsector remained quite stable, with only two new entrants from
1983 to 1988.
Another measure of entry barriers used was the minimum
efficient scale (Table 6). The glass-based subsector again had the
highest ratio in the industry.
The high entry barriers in the glass-based subsector may be
explained by the dominance of a highly vertically-integrated
conglomerate.This conglomerate has plants operating in the different






1983 1988 1983 1988
Glass-based 16 44 37 47
Metal-based 27 4 53 11
Paw-based 11 9 22 14
Plastic-based 14 16 8 12
Notes: Price Cost Margin = (Value Added. Compensation) I Value ofOutput
Minimum Efficient Scale = Average value added offirms accounting fortop 50%of
subsaOor value added / Subsaotor value added
Sourceofbasic deJa : CensusofManufacturing Establishments,
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than 20 percent of total industry sales.This firm recently entered into
a contract with a technologically=advanced Japanese glass"
manufacturer, thus boosting its strength in the domestic marketplace.
Another characteristic of the packaging industry is the
considerable number of affiliated firms among the ,industry leaders,
which are mostly spin-off enterprises from an expanding parent
company.
PkOBLEMS, ISSUES, AND EVOLUTION OF GOVE_MENT POLICIES
Problems and Issues
Packaging end-users have long bewailed the high costs,
inconsistency, and often inferior quality of locally-produced
packaging goods. Container manufacturers have the same problems58 _ Ma,Cristina S.Medilo
with raw materials. Both parties contend that high tariff rates (even
with the institution of tariff reforms) discourage the importation of
usual/y-preferred imported substitutes. They also acknowledge the
need for standards and the means to enforce already existing standards
to ensure the quality of packaging goods and raw materials. Two of
the critical problems of the industry thus pertain to high tariff rates
and the lack of standards.
The problem of standards is related to market-niching. Exported
goods, as well asthose destined for the local market but produced by
multinationals, generally come in packages of higher quality than
those produced by small domestic-oriented end-users. The quality of
the package thus becomes a function of the quality Ofdemand.
Industry sources say that the industry is indeed demand-driven.
Most efforts to upgrade technology and acquire more modern
equipment were only reactions to the demands of end-using firms.
The link between packaging producer and end-user can become so
close as to almost completely tie the growth of the former to that of
the latter.
Upgrading and maintaining standards presupposes huge
investments on expensive capital equipment. High interest rates
coupled with imperfect capital markets are the main obstacles to this
"goal.
Another important issue is the limited variety of packaging
products available,particularly to small end-users (mostly exporters).
This stems from the nature of the processes involved in packaging
manufacture, which require long production runs and, consequently,
volume orders. This is particularly true in glass-based packaging
production, which ischaracterized by large economies of scale owing
to the high cost of interrupting an almost continuous production
process and the high cost of moulds (De Dios, Bautista, and De Dios
1993). Product differentiation in the end-using markets, on the other
hand, calls for a targe range of package sizes and designs. Hence, the
mismatch between the technology requirements ofproducers and the
differentiated products of end-using firms.
To go around this problem, packaging producers have suggested
that end-users pool their packaging requirements together to generatePackaging industry _ 59
volume orders. But the prospect of revealing their packaging
requirements m and, consequently, their share of market demand --
to their competitors makes this suggestion unacceptable to end-users.
They propose, instead, that the packaging manufacturers arrange for
the pooling of orders among themselves since they possess
information about the end-users' requirements. No agreement has
yet been reached as of this writing.
The industry faces other problems, including technical smuggling
and the lack of trained personnel which has sometimes resulted in
pirating. These problems take on singular significance depending on
the subsector under study.
Evolution of GovernmentPoliciesBeforetheTradeR_Corm
Before the 1980s, the industrial incentive system biased toward
import substitution in consumer goods encouraged new production
activities, which consisted of assemblyand packing operations heavily
dependent on imported materials and capitalequipment _autista and
Power 1979). An import-dependent, import-substituting enterprise,
the packaging industry benefited from the "cascading" tariffstructure
within this protectionist trade regime. The "essentiality" criterion
favored the importation of capital equipment and raw material inputs
against finished consumer goods, imports of which were considered
lessessential.The 1978 average tariffrates on finished packaging goods
and raw materials (Tables 7 and 8, respectively) show that the metal-
and paper-based subsectors were the biggest beneficiaries of this
protection structure in the industry.
The TariffReform Programsof 1981 and 1991
In 1981, following Executive Orders (EO) 609 and gg2-A, the
first TILP was launched, to be completed over a period of five yea,o
until 1985. Under the new tariff structure, there was a significant
drop in the duties applied to all finished packaging goods. By 1985,
paper-based goods, formerly the most protected, could be imported




Average TariffRatesonRnished Packaging GoodsbySubsector: 1978to1985
(In percent, weightedbyimportshares)
•1978 1981 1983 1986 1988 1991 1993 1995
Glass-based 35.36 29.92 29.92 29.92 29.92 29.92 23.64 16.83
Metal-based 63.02 48.53 36.30 35.05 35.05 36.21 31.00 28.05
Paper-based 100.00 80.00 55.31 40.00 40.00 40.00 25.00 25.00
Plastic-based 50.00 13.75 12.81 11.87 11.87 13.75 12.81 11.87














Average TariffRates onPackaging RawMaterials bySubsector: 1978to1995
(Inpercent,w_ghted by importshares)
1978 1981 1983 1986 1988 1991 1993 1995
Glass-based 20.00 5.59 3.00 3.00 3.00 16.29 13.70 13.70
Metal-based 29.41 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
Paper-based 71.82 56.14 41.60 40.16 40.16 29.36 21.91 20.00
PlaslJc-based32.87 22.82 21.49 20.15 20.15 16.79 15.85 .15.65
Source olbasic data: Tat#f andCus_'nsCode ofthePhilippines, Foreign Trade Sra_s_cs. Tariff Commission.
O3
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average tariff rate on pla_ac-based goods was reduced by 76 percent
from its pre-TR.P to its 1985 level.The metal-based subsector also
experienced significant tariff rate reductions. Although the rates on
glass-based packaging goods were lowered at the onset of the TR.P,
these remained unchanged within the duration of the program.This is
probably due to the fact that the rates were already much lower than
those levied on most other goods. Moreover, this subsector is
dominated by a conglomerate capable of wielding strong political
influence.
As for packaging raw materials, the paper-based subsector again
experienced a significant reduction in tariff rates, with the maximum
rate of 75 percent in 1981 gradually being lowered to 50 percent in
1985 (Table 8). Inputs to plastic- and glass-based packaging products
were also accorded tariff rate reductions. Rates on metal-based raw
materials retained their 1981 level of 20 percent, effectively
encouraging the purchase oftinplates from the sole domestic supplier,
the then government-owned and -controlled National Steel
Corporation (NSC).
Under the 1991 tariff restructuring scheme covered by Executive
Order 470, packaging products are now levied average tariff rates
ranging from 23 to 32 percent (Table 7).The average tariff rate on
plastic-based finished packaging goods rose from 11.87 percent in
1988 to 13.75 percent in 1991, the first year of implementation of
EO 470.The increase was not due to the "tariffication" of previously-
lifted import restrictions since the importation of plastic-based
finished packaging goods had never been regulated. This may have
been part of efforts to compensate for the low protection levels
previously given the subsector (details in the section on Effective
Protection).
The tariff rates that apply to packaging raw materials now range
from 10 to 30 percent, with a meanof20 percent (Table 8).Note that
the average tariff rate on glass-based raw materials increased from 3
percent in 1988 to 16.29 percent in 1991. Subsector'level data show
that this is attributable to the increased rates on all glass-based raw
materials.As in the case of plastic-based finished goods, this does not
seem to be the result of"tariffication" efforts since glass-based rawPackaging Industry I_ 63
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material imports had never been restricted. Note also that the average
tariff rate on metal-based raw materials, which remained at its 1981
level all through the first phase of the T1LP, still retains this level until
the end of the current phase.This points to the high level ofprotection
being accorded the NSC.
In general, rates that now apply to packaging raw materials are
relatively lower than those being levied on packaging products.Thus,
even with the instituted reforms, the "cascading" tariff scheme is still
in force, according the industry substantial protection.
For this reason, end-users claim that the cost of packaging is still
too high. Even with the full implementation of EO 470, the 1995
rates on finished packaging goods would still be on the high side,
mostly ranging from 20 percent to 30 percent. Considering the
natural barriers to importing, packaging products will practically
remain as "non-tradeables" unless the tariff rates are drastically
reduced.
An example of a natural barrier to importing is the bulky nature
of packages, which will entail higher freight costs. It is also
inconvenient to import packaging products because they appear to
unnecessarily use up space (importing packages is said to be like
"importing air"). Moreover, the large volume of orders associated
with' importing packaging goods would mean more storage costs for
the importer.
Still another natural barrier is the longer lead time required in
placing orders for imported packages. End-users (mostly exporters),
whose production patterns may be subject to factors beyond human
control, have difficulty meeting lead time.
PHILFOODEX, an association of local food manufacturers and
exporters, is currently lobbying for the free importation of raw
materials and semi-finished packaging products not locally
manufactured. It is also pushing for a 3 percent duty on: (1) raw
materials that are not locally, available and (2) finished packaging
products that cannot be sourced locally in the quality, quantity, and
design required by small food processors. The association claims that
this will enable the small- and medium-scale food manufacturers to
compete in the world market.64 _ Ma. Cristina S, Medilo
A Senate bill seeking to decrease the import duty on Tetra Brik
aseptic packaging has also been proposed. By virtue of EO 470,
aluminum foil backed with paper, paperboard, plastics or similar
materials from which Tetra Briks are made are currently levied a 20
percent import duty. If passed, Senate Bill 843 will bring down the
tariff rate on this item to 5 percent when used for domestically-
manufactured milk products and 10percent when produced for other
local food products such as fruit juices. This will reduce the total
product cost of milk and other food products.
The suggested tariff rates seem too low, however, considering
foreign exchange rate distortions. A tariff rate of 20 percent would
seem sufficient to correct the distortions in the foreign exchange rate
and effectively equalize domestic and free trade prices.
ImpOrtLiberalization
During the first phase of the Import Liberalization Program
that is,before its suspension in 1983 -- only paper- and glass-based
packaging raw materials were deregulated (Table 9). A more
comprehensive rationalization of licensing procedures for the
importation of packaging-related goods was undertaken in 1986.
Note, however, that between April 1986 and July 1987, only
packaging raw materials were deregulated. Import restrictions on all
regulated finished packaging goods and metal-based raw materials
were lifted only in December 1987.
The 'delay' in the lifting of import restrictions on finished goods
relative to those on raw materials (except for metal-based inputs)
reinforced the bias of the "cascading" tariff structure against raw
material production in favor of finished goods manufacture.
Nonetheless, this seems to have worked well for the industry. The
easier access to raw materials resulting from the earlier liberalization
of packaging inputs relative to output probably enabled small-scale
concerns to enter the industry (Table 3). The more competitive
atmosphere created by the lowering of tariff rates on finished goods,
on the other hand, forced both old and new plants to operate at more




Covered bytheImport Liberalization Program
CB Effectivity Product
Circular Date
CBC850 2-15-82 Paper, corrugated, embossed orperforated
Other glass, notelsewhere classified (n.e.c)
CBC1100 4-30-86 Polyethylene inprimary forms
Copolymers ofvinyl chloride inprimary forms
Paperboard, embossed orperforated
CBC1109 7-18-86 Polysterene inprimary forms
CBC1150 7-23-87 Paperboard, ruled, lined,orsquared, butnotothenNise
pointed
Paper andpaperboard, coated orimpregnated with
artificial orsynthetic resins
•Paper andpaperboard, coated orimpregnated, ne.c
CBC1167 12-31.87 Paperboard, corrugated
Coated orgummed kraftpaper
Paperbags andsacks forarticles weighing 11 36kg
orless
Paperbags andsacks forarticles weighing more than
11.36 kg
Multi-wall bags andsacks ofdimension 17'x4"or
smaller
Multi-waU bags and sacks forarticles weighing 11.36 kg
ormore
Boxes, corrugated carton
Boxes andother packaging containers orpaperboard or
cardboard except 31.6mm
Tinned sheets and plates ofsteel
Tinplates when imported directly byfood processors
upon prior authorization oftheIron andSteel Authority
Source of basic data: List of Liberalized Items (1981.1992)Tariff Commission,
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to have improved between 1983 and 1988, and this seems to be due
mainly to the increased efficiency of small-scale establishments.
Other DomesticRegulatoryConditionsand PolicyIssues
Apart from the general incentive scheme embodied in the Board
of Investments 1987 Omnibus Investments Code, no government
incentive or development programs have been particularly designed
for the packaging industry, mainly because the industry is already
overcrowded.
The log ban has also taken its toll on the supply of pulp for the
production of paper and paperboard container..
Analysis of Results
CHANGES IN THE LEVEL OF EFFECTIVE PROTECTION
protection structure of the packaging industry may be analyzed
using effective protection rates (EPtLs).The EPR isthe percentage excess
of domesticvalueadded(atprotectedprices)overworldvalueadded(atfiee
trade or borderprices) (Tariff Commission undated).Value added is
simply the difference between the value of output and the
corresponding value of inputs used (both net of salestaxes).
In 1983, the packaging industry registered an EPlL of 58.91
percent, higher than the manufacturing sector avenge of 38 percent
(Table10).The industry EPILwas also higher than those of some end-
using industries -- garments and dairy -- but lower than those of
other end-users -- processed meat, appliances, and semi-conductors
(Table 11).
Although the computed EP1L for theepackaging industry was
higher than the manufacturing sector average,52 percent of the plants
received lower protection than that enjoyed by the average
manufacturing plant (Table 12).The high industry EPR. may be due
to the fact that the plants which had EPILs higher than the
manufacturing sector average -- constituting 44 percent of the
industry total _ were large.The remaining 4 percent of the plants
had negative EPILs.
A negative EPIL may imply negative protection if it results from a
negative EP1Lnumerator.A more detailed examination ofphnt-level
data reveals that none of the plants with negative EPILs received
negative protection. All registered negative free trade value added
instead _ that is, their negative EP1Ls resulted from a negative
denominator. This means that the protection structure had
encouraged the operation of plants which would have generated,;33
Table10 oo
EffecUveProtection andImplicitTariffRatesbySubsector: 1983and1988 A
(In percent}
1983 1988 Change
EPR Tj Ti Tj Ti EPR Tj Ti Tj Ti (EPR)
Glass-based 60.06 28.69 3.00 43.44 15.88 32.61 25.84 3.00 40.25 13.30 -45.70
Metal-based 89.97 40.61 20.00 56.09 35.00 82.18 30.34 20.00 52.63 32.60 -8.66
Paper-based 118.00 58.14 4667 76.25 65.00 24.85 39.53 45.56 54.00 60.12 -78.94
Plastic-based 33.51 33.19 33.00 50.00 49.63 5.41 17.96 26.00 43.00 38.60 -83.86
Industry 58.9I 24.52
]j = average implicit tariff onexporta_andimportable output
= average implicit tariffonexportable andimportable inputs
= average implicit tariff onimportable output
Ti = average implicit _ onimportable inputs E
Theindustry EPRisa weighted average of_e plant EPRs (seeChapter onMe_odok_jy for_e procedure used incornpu_ng industry vatues).
Thus, _erewasnoneedtocompute industry implid( tariffs which would have litlle meaning, since they would cover highly heterogeneous subsectors.
Source ofbasic data :"Census ofManutacturing Establishments,' Tariffand Customs Code ofthePhi/ippines, Tariff Commission.
E
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Table 11
Effective Protection Rates oflhePackaging Industry
and Some End-Using Indusbles: 1983 and1988
Industries 1983 1988
Packaging 58.91 24.52
Poultry Dressed 48.88 89.01
Meat Processing 773.35 97.53
Fresh Milk 6.79 33.63
Powdered Milk 21.39 8.75
Butter and Cheese 38.08 46.83




Source ofbasic data: "Census ofManufacturing Establishments," Tar/ff and
Customs Code ofthePhilippinas, Tariff Commission,
negative international value added without tariffs and other forms of
protection.
At the subsector level,the paper-based group received the greatest
protection while the plastic-based group received the least (Table 10).
This pattern is supported by plant-level data: 95 percent of paper-
based plants registered EPRs higher than the manufacturing sector
average, while 99 percent of the plastic-based plants had EPRs lower
than this average. The high EPRs of the glass- and metal-based
subsectors are also consistent with the large proportion of plants in
these subsectors which r_gistered EPRs higher than the
manufacturing sector average.
Protection at the industry level declined by almost 60 percent in
1988.The industry EPR of 24.52 percent (Table 10) was much lower
than the manufacturing sector average of 35.5 percent that year.
Almost 60 percent of the packaging plants had positive EPRs lessthan
the manufacturing average, as opposed to only 52 percent in 1983
(Table 12). Only 21 percent received protection higher than that




EPRLevel* Percentage EPRLevel** Percentage
( % ) Numberof Plants Sham ( % ) Numberof Plants Share
<0.00 7 4.0 <0.00 48 19.7
0.01-38.00 92 52.0 0.01- 35.50 144 59.0
38.01- 76.00 40 23.0 35.51- 71.00 39 16.0
>76.00 37 21.0 >71.00 13 5.3
Total 176 100.0 Total 244 100.0
' Except forthedass ofnega_te EPRs, upper dassboundaries aremultiples oftheaverage EPRfor themanufacturing
sector in1983, which was 38.0. percent.
** Theaverage EPR lotOlemaubctudng sector in1988 was35.50percent.
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in 1983. The rest, which comprised the minority of 19 percent,
registerednegative EPtks.A closer look at plant-level data revealsthat
43 of the 48 plants with negative EPtLs received negative protection,
as opposed to none in 1983.
At the industry level, then, there was a general decline in
protection, with EPlks moving toward the lower levels.
Subsector EPRa also showed marked reductions in protection.
The plastic-based subsector experienced the most significant
reduction, thus remaining the least protected with an EPR. of only 5
percent (Table I0). The paper-based group, formerly the most
protected, as well as the glass-based subsector, also experienced
significant reductions in protection. By contrast, the metal-based
subsector, which became the most protected, registered the least
decline in protection.
Ninety-five percent of the plants in the industry which received
negative protection were from the plastic-based subsector (Table 12).
These accounted for 33 percent of the subsector total. This explains
the plastic-based subsector's low EPR.
Across the subsectors, the number of plants with positive EPlks
less than the manufacturing sector average increased. Although many
of the plants still had EPlks higher than the manufacturing average,
few had EPRs more than twice this average.
The EPtk indicates the relative incentives given to different
subsectors and plants. It focuses on the relativeposition ofsubsectors
and plants in the EPtk scale since "protection is a relative concept"
(Tan 1979). However, tradeable goods, as a whole, may be penalized
relative to non-tradeables by an overvalued currency, or can be
pr6tected by an undervalued currency. Thus, another measure of
protection, the net effective protection rate (NEPR.), was used to
adjust for the extent of currency overvaluation.
For both 1983 and 1988,computed NEPR. values for the industry
and each of the subsectorswere lower than the EPR. values by around
21 percent.Thus, currency overvaluation penalized tradeables relative
to non-tradeables in both years.
In sum, there was an overalldecline in protection in the packaging
industry from 1983 to 1988.This downward trend in protection levels
is evident at the industry, subsector, and plant levels.72 _ Ma,Cristina S,Medilo
The TRP has considerably rationalized the protection structure in
the packaging industry. But because there are many natural barriers to
importing, the degree of rationalization achieved so far appears to be
insufficient to make the industry world-competitive.
ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY/CHOICE OF TECHNIQUE
The study utilized the concept of DRC in measuring allocative
efficiency at the industry and subsector levels and efficiency in terms
of choice of technique at the plant level.
In 1983, the packaging industry registered aDR_Cvalue of 28.70,
which is equivalent to an aUocativelyinefficient DRC-SER, ratio of
2.07 (Table 13). Only 32 establishments, or 18percent of the industry
total, proved efficient in terms of the right choice of technique in
1983 (Table 14).These, together with the mildly inefficient plants,
constituted 33 percent of the industry total.The rest, which made up
the majority of 6.7 percent, were either inefficient or dissaving on
foreign exchange.
Twenty-four, or 75 percent, of the efficient plants in 1983 were
small (Table 14). Medium- and large-scale plants both accounted for
12.5 percent of the total number of efficient plants. Although the
smallplants constituted the majority of efficient establishments in the
industry, they alsocomposed the majority of inefficient establishments
(64 percent) and of those yielding negative net foreign exchange
earning or saving (73 percent).
At the subsector level, all the subsectors, except for the metal-
based group, were inefficient based on their DRC-SER. ratios (Table
13). The metal-based subsector registered a DR_C-SEK ratio
indicative of mild inefficiency.
A closer look at subsector-level data reveals that the plastic-based
group had the biggest proportion of efficient plants to the subsector
total, at 23 percent, in 1983.The share of efficient plants to the metal-
, glass;-, and paper-based subsector totals were 15 percent, 12.5
perce::_t,and 12 percent, respectively.Packaging Industry I_ 73
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Table 13
DomesUcResource Costat ShadowPricesbySubsector: 1983and1988
1983 1988 % Change
DRC DRC/SER* DRC DRC/SER** (DRC/ SER)
Glass-based 31.63 2.28 27.62 1.05 .64.0
Metal-based 19.35 1.39 64.12 2.43 75.0
Paper-based 44.69 3.22 72.42 2.75 -15.0
Plastic-based 32.59 2.35 51.26 1.94 .17.0
Indusb 7 28.70 2.07 50.08 1.90 -8.0
* DRC/SER ratios areinterpreted asfollows :
0.01-1.20: Efficient
1.21-1.50 : Mildly ineflident
>1.50: Ineffldent
SER(Shadow Exchange Rate)for 1983 was13.89,
** SER=26.37
SQurce ofbasic data: Census ofManufacturing Establishments,
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Although the plastic-based group had the biggest proportion of
efficient plants to the subsector total, it was still inefficient asa whole
because the majority of its efficient plants were small.
The proportion ofinefficient plants and negative foreign exchange
earners or savers to the total number of plants in the paper-based
subsector totaled 81 percent in 1983, followed by the glass-based
group at 73 percent. The inefficient plants in the plastic- and metal-
based subsectors constituted 63 percent and 59 percent of the
subsector totals, respectively. Note that the metal-based subsector,
which had the smallestproportion ofinefficient plants t0 the subsector
total, also had the lowest DRC-SER. ratio.
A slight reduction in inefficiency appears to have taken place in
1988. Although the industry DRC value actually rose, the DRC-Table14 ="
Distribution ofPackagingPlantsbyEmployment Size**andEfficiencyLevel:1983and1988 •
Efficiency
Level* 1983 1988
Small Medium Large Total Small Medium Large Total
Efficient 24 4 4 32 71 9 10 go
Mildly Inefficient 16 4 7 27 15 5 4 24
Inefficient 65 17 20 102 77 10 17 104
Dissaving"* 11 1 3 15 20 5 1 26
Total 116 26 34 176 183 29 32 244
* Based o_DRC/SER ratios: ** Sizerefers toQle number ofemployed workers:
Efficient • 0.01-1.2 Small • 5 : gg
Mildly Inef_cient• 121- 1.50 Medium • 100-199 90
Inefficient • >1.50 Large • 200andabove o
Dissaving • <0.00
*** Dissaving refers tonega_kve netforeign exchange earning orsaving, oo
Source ofbasic data:Census o_ Manufsctudng EstabSshmenls. _.Packaging Industry b 75
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SElL ratio, which is the indicator of allocative efficiency and
comparative advantage, declined by 8 percent its 1983 value (Table
13).Thirty-seven percent of the plants in the industry were efficient,
as compared to only 18 percent in 1983 (Table 14).These efficient
andmildly inefficient plants made up 47 percent of the industry total,
higher than the 1983 figure of only 33 percent.The inefficient plants
and the net foreign exchange dissaversconstituted only 53 percent of
the industry total, down from their 1983 share of 67 percent.
Except for the metal-based subsector, the DR.C-SEIL ratios ofthe
three other subsectors dropped from their 1983 levels (Table 13).
However, only the glass-based subsector proved efficient in 1988. It
also posted the biggest gain in allocative efficiency- or reduction in
inefficiency -- in the entire industry.The metal-based group seemed
to have fared the worst between the two reference points. It had the
highest DlLC-SElL ratio in 1988 from the lowest ratio in 1983.
Although 67 percent of the plants in the glass-based subsector
were inefficient, this subsector as a whole registered an efficient
DKC-SElL ratio because its two efficient plants were very large.These
two plants accounted for 71 percent of total subsector output in 1988,
thus 'compensating' for the inefficiencies of the other smaller plants.
The plastic-based subsector, on the other hand, turned out to be
mildly inefficient despite the fact that 48 percent of its plants were
efficient.These efficient and mildly inefficient plants were fairly small.
The high DR.Cs of the metal- and paper-based subsectors in 1988
are consistent with the high proportion of inefficient plants and
foreign exchange dissavers,relative to the efficient ones, in these two
subsectors.
As in 1983, the majority of the efficient plants belonged to the
small-scale category (Table 14). Moreover, the share of small efficient
plants in the total number of plants in the industry rose from 14 to 29
percent between the two years. Note that the majority of new
establishments in 1988 belonged to the small-scale category (Table 3).
Since the proportion of small efficient plants to the industry total rose
from 1983 to 1988, these small new entrants were probably efficient.
The TLP may have indeed improved the atmosphere of
competition in the local packaging industry, allowingentry mainly to76 _ Ma.Cristina S.Medilo
efficient plants and inducing already existing plants to reduce
inefficiency. As discussed in the section on Import Liberalization, the
easier access to raw materials resulting from the deregulation of
packaging raw material importation might have enabled small plants
to enter the industry. In view of the threat of competition resulting
from lower tariff rates on finished goods, however, these plants were
forced to adopt efficient practices, contributing to the rise in the level
of efficiency in the industry in 1988. The absence of data on the
pattern of entry and exit prevents us from concluding that the plants
which remained also became lessinefficient, although such a scenario
is indeed plausible.
Asfor the medium- and large-scale establishments, the proportion
of efficient plants to the category totals also increased (Table 14).
Recall that the share of large plants in total industry CVA increased
between 1983 and 1988 (Table 4).This would imply that resource
allocation did improve, since more resources appear to have been
channeled into efficient plants.
Cross-tabulations of DRC/SER and EPR levels were made to
'correlate' the degree of protection with the level of efficiency. From
Table 15 we see that in 1983, 24 percent of the inefficient plants
received very high protection, while 65 percent of those which
received high protection were inefficient. Fifty-seven percent of those
which received negative protection were inefficient, while 3 percent
of the inefficient plants received negative protection. The very small
proportion of efficient plants may be attributed to the high levels of
protection received by the industry that year.
In 1988, 42 percent of the plants which received negative
protection were efficient while 56 percent were either inefficient or
dissaving on foreign exchange. Twenty-two percent of the efficient
plants received negative protection. Only two plants which received
extremely high protection were efficient.
At the subsector level,the metal-based group, which experienced
the least reduction in protection in 1988 (Table 10), became more
inefficient, registering the highest DRC-SER ratio that year (Table
13).The other three subsectors, which all had lower EPRs in 1988,
also had lower DRC-SER ratios."0
_o
Table15 o




DRC* EPR** DRC* EPR**
<0.00 0.01-38 38.01-76 >76 Total <0 0.01-35.5 35.51-71 >71 Total <
0.01- 16.00 0 21 7 4 32 0.01- 39.90 20 54 14 2 90
16.01-20.00 2 13 5 7 27 31.91-39.87 1 16 4 3 24
>20.O0 4 55 19 24 102 >39.87 21 60 17 6 104
<0 1 3 9 2 15 <0 6 14 4 2 26
Total 7 92 40 37 176 Total 48 144 39 13 244






"* Except for_e class ofnegative EPFIs, upper class boundaries aremultiples oftheaverage EPR forthemanulactudng sector :38.00percent in
1983; 35.50percent in1988.
Source otbasic data: Cansus ofManutaotudng Establishments. W'
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Thus, high protection levels seem to be associated with low
efficiency levels. Low protection levels may have forced the plants
concerned to become less inefficient to survive.
It was discussed in Chapter 2 under the section on Imports of
Packaging Goods that the tariffreductions after the first round of the
TRP (1981-1985) seemed insufficient to induce significant increases
in imports of packaging goods. Import penetration rates even declined
for some subsectors between 1983 and 1988.Yet the level ofallocative
efficiency in the industry appears to have improved. This seems to
support the import disciplinehypothesis:What matters is not actual
competition from imports but the threatof competition which forces
incumbents to become more efficient and allows entry mainly to
efficient plants. Incumbents may have been lobbying for higher tariffs
because they perceive a threat from imports.
These results are encouraging; the objective of trade liberalization
is not to swamp the local market with imported products and,
consequently, to stifle local industries, but only to create an
atmosphere of competition conducive to improvements in efficiency
and world competitiveness.
Since the mere threat of competition from imports has induced
an over-aU reduction in inefficiency, there seem to be no structural
barriers to importing in the industry, even if there are structural
barriers to entry in production in some subsectors (Chapter 2,
Structure). Structural barriers to importing are present when big
domestic producers themselves are the main importers. Policy-related
barriers to importing remain, however, in the form of high tariff rates
and tedious Customs procedures.
Overall, then, DRC levels between 1983 and 1988 significantly
declined, denoting allocative efficiency gains which moved the
packaging industry to a position of improved comparative advantage.
This may be partly ascribed to the more competitive conditions
created by the TLP.Packaging Industry _ 79
COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE
International competitiveness refers to the ability of the sector,
industry, or plant to compete in domestic markets with importers and
in external markets with other exporters (including domestic
producers in the destination market) (Tecson 1992). To measure
competitive advantage, the study utilized the ratio of the domestic
resource cost in market prices to the official exchange rate, DRCM/
OER. M denotes DtLC in market(asopposed to shadow) prices and
OER refers to the official (instead of shadow) exchange rate.
Computed DILCM-OER values are presented in Table 16.
Based on their DILCM-OER. ratios, none of the subsectors
showed competitive advantage in 1983 (a high D1LCM-OE1L ratio
implies non-viability of competing in the export market). Although
these ratios declined in 1988, the drop was insufficient to move the
subsectors into a position of competitive advantage. The glass-based
subsector, which posted significant gains in comparative advantage
between 1983 and 1988, still remained uncompetitive in 1988.This
suggests that the domestic tax system aswell as the structure of wages
are major sources of distortion.
TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY
A plant is considered technicallyefficientif it producesthe maximum
quantity of output attainablefrom a given 'bundle of inputs. The study
measured technical efficiency using Farrell's (1957) "frontier" or"best
practice" method.According to Hill and Kalirajan (1991), a technical
efficiency coefficient (TEC) of 75 percent would qualifi] a plant or
industry astechnically efficient.
In 1983,TECs computed at the level of the subsector show that
only the paper-based subsector was technically efficient (Table 17).
The glass-based group was only two percentage points less than the
margin. The metal-based group was the most inefficient.
Although subsector TECs were generally below the efficient
range, there were nevertheless efficient plants within each subsector80 _ Ma, Cristina S, Medilo
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Table16
DomesticResource CostatMarketPricesbySubsector: 1983and1988
1983 1968 % Change
(DRCM/
DRCM DRCM/OER* DRCM DRCMIOER** OER)
Glass-based 45.22 4.06 28.93 1.37 -66.0
Metal-based 23,57 2,12 69.08 3,27• 54,0
Paper-based 72.24 6.50 80.41 3.82 -41.0
Plastic-based 55.0 4,95 • 55.60 2.64 .47.0
Industry 40,93 3,57 51,41 2.44 -34.0
• DRC/OER ratios areinterpreted asfollows :
0.01-1.20 : Efficient
1.21- 1.50 : Mildly Inefficient
>1.50 : Inefficient
OER( Official Exchange Rate ) for1983 was 11.1127
•" OER= 21.0947
Source ofbasic data :Census ofManufacturing Establishments.
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Table17
TechnicalEfficiency Coefficients (TEC)bySubsector: 1983and1988
(%)
1983 1988 Change
Glass.based 73.0 61.0 -16.0
Metal-based 31.0 58.0 87.0
Paper-based 78.0 56.0 -28.0
Plastic-based 50.0 39.0 -22.0
• 0 Note:ATEC 75_/o indicates technical efficiency.
Source ofbasic data :Census ofManufacturing Establishments.
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(Table 18). Sixteen percent of all the plants in the industry were
efficient, with the glass-and paper-based subsectors having the biggest
proportion of efficient plants to the subsector total.
Technical efficiency in the packaging industry appears to have
declined between 1983 and 1988. None of the computed subsector
TECs were within the efficient range in 1988. Even the metal-based
subsector, which was the only gainer in terms of technical efficiency
between 1983 and 1988, was not efficient. At tl_e plant level, the
proportion of efficient plants to the industry total dropped from 16
percent in 1983 to only 9 percent in 1988.Thus, despite the marked
reductions in aUocativeinefficiency -- or, equivalently, the significant
gains in aUocative efficiency -- as reflected in the lower 1988 DRC-
SER. ratios, technical efficiency actually declined,a°
Apossible explanation for the contrasting movements of the DKC
andTEC measures between 1983 and 1988 is that the TEC measure
may be lessan indicatorofdeviations from "bestpractice"or world-standard
technologythan of deviations from the "average"technicalfff_ciency levelof
the plants in a given subsector or industry. It ispossible, then, that the
averagedeviationwidenedbecause
1) the most efficientones(that is, those at the frontier) improvedtheir
technical_ciency mote than the rest of the plants in the subsector,
or
2) themost e.ff_cient onesdeclinedin shareofoutput,which influenced the
subsectoral averageTECs.
The real reason for the declining TECs cannot be ascertained from
available data, however, since the statistical package used to estimate
technical efficiency does not provide for a way of identifying specific
plants and thus tracing their performance patterns between the two
reference years.
10. The comparison between allocative and technical efficiency is po_ible because
the data sets used in computing for DtkC and TEC are the same. The number of
plant_ for which DtkCs and TECs were computed are roughly the same for 1983
and 1988 (Tables 28 and 31).(3O
Table18 ro
Distn'bution of PackagingPlants bySubsectorandTECLevel: 1983and 1988 •
1983 1988
TEC<0.75 TEC• 0.75 < 0.75 0.75
Number %Share in Number %Share in Total Number %Share In Number %Share in Total
ofPlants SubsectorofPlants Subsector ofPlants SubsectorofPlants Subsector
Tota| Total Total Total
Glass-based 5 62.5 3 37.5 8 7 77.8 2 22.2 9
Metal-based 29 87.9 4 12.1 33 36 75.0 12 25.0 48
Paper-based 28 66.7 14 33.3 42 59 93.7 4 ._6.3 63
Plastic-based 85 92.4 7 7.6 92 120 96.8 4 3.2 124
Total 147 84.0 28 16.0 175 222 90.9 22 9.1 244
Note: Aplant wi_a:1"EC. 0.75isconsidered technically emcieflt.
C)
o1
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In any case, the results highlight the importance of non-price
barriers to technical efficiency such as: (1) access to supplier
technology; (2) lack of standards; and (3)low demand because of the
sluggish growth of end-using industries.Thus, policies other than the
TLP seem necessary.
FACTOR USE AND PRODUCTIVITY
Except for the metal-based group, capital productivity increased
in all the subsectors between 1983 and 1988 (Table 19).The gh_s-
based subsector experienced the biggest gain in capital productivity.
Labor productivity increased only in the glass- and plastic-based
III I I I I I I
Table19
Measuresof FactorProductivity bySubsecto_. 1983and1988
(at1972prices)
CapitalPreduclivity* LaborProduclivity**(P)
1983 1988 1983 1988
Glass-based 0.04 0.22 12,821 41,483
Metal-based 0.06 0.03 14,752 7,875
Paper-based 0.02 0.04 12,570 9,833
Plastic-based 0.04 0.05 10,743 248,875
Industry 0.04 0.07 124,06 167,836
" Value added perunit ofcapital
Capital wasvalued atreplacement cost.
Value added wasadjusted bytheGDPdeflator forthemanufacturing sector while thecost
ofcapital wasadjusted bythecapital deflator
** Value added perworker
Value added wasadjusted bytheGDPdeflator.
Source ofbasic data: Census ofManufacturing Establishments.
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subsectors, with the plastic-based subsector posting a significant
increase.
Capital and labor per plant declined between 1983 and 1988 in all
but the plastic-based subsector, where capital per plant actually rose
(Table 20). Capital-labor ratios likewise declined, again except in the
plastic-based subsector. The general decline in factor-plant ratios
nfight be correlated with the entry of small plants and the possible
rationalization of incumbents.
CONCENTRATION, BARRIERSTOENTRY,ANDMARKETPOWER
As noted in Chapter 2, the study examines the structure of the
packaging industry using the concepts of concentration, barriers to
entry, and market power.
A distinction must be made between production and seller
concentration. Technically, seller concentration is production
concentrationif imports and exports are ignored (Lee 1992).The measures
of concentration used in the study --VACR-4 and the Herfindahl
index --pertain to production concentration.
Production concentration is expected to increase in the advent of
trade liberalization if inefficient Chamberlinian plants exit due to
increased competitive pressure from imports. It may also decrease if
new efficient plants enter the industry due to the easier access to raw
materials, and the more competitive atmosphere, occasioned by trade
reform. Thus, trade liberalization can influence the level of
concentration in opposite directions. These two movements were
observed in the packaging industry.
Production concentration increased in the glass- and plastic-based
subsectors, whereas it declined in the metal- and paper-based
subsectors in 1988 (Table 5). Parallel movements were observed in the
case of price-cost margins, the indicator used to measure the degree
of market power.This supports the findings of earlier studies on the
positive relationship between concentration ratios and price-cost
margins (Cowling 1976)."U
Table20 o
Indicators ofFactor UsebySubsector: 1983 and1988 _-.
(.Q
Capital perPlant* Workers perPlant Capital-Labor Ratio* _.
(P000,1972 pdces ) (P000,1972pdces )
1983 1988 1983 1988 1983 1988 <
Glass-based 202,205,669 81,24t,373 584 421 345,798 192,972
Metal-based 36,525,822 27,476,062 145 111 251,392 247, 532
Paper-based 35,845,655 14,916,753 69 67 506, 567 222,638
Plastic-based 27,849,467 334,951,972 92 74 300,616 4,526,378
Industry 393,590,446 1,583,720,379 890 673 3,281,007 2,353,225
' Capital was valued at_eptacement cost and converted into 1972 prices by_ecapital deflator.
Source of besic data: Census of Manufacturing Establishments.
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The higher concentration ratios and price-cost margins in the
glass- and plastic-based subsectors after the trade reform may, at first,
seem puzzling since in both subsectors, the number of plants also
increased in 1988 (Table 3). However, it appears that large plants
expanded evenas newsmallplants becameoperativein these two subsectors.
This seems to be particularly true for the glass-based subsector which
is characterized by large economies of scale.Taking advantage of these
scale economies, the large glass-based plants must have increased their
market share and even more significantly increased their price-cost
margins. As earlier noted, high price-cost margins may indicate the
presence of entry barriers and a high degree of market power.
The higher concentration ratio and price-cost margin of the glass-
based subsector in 1988 seem to imply that trade reform will not be
able to rationalize the industrial structure if other factors inherent in
the structure itself come in the way.
Although trade reform did not reduce the level of concentration
and the degree of market power in the glass-based subsector, its
positive effect on the allocative efficiency of this subsector was not
undermined. It was, in fact, the biggest gainer in efficiency among all
the subsectors. A closer look at plant-level data reveals that the
significant reduction in this subsector's DRCs was due to the increased
level of efficiency in its largest plants. Thus, even as trade reform
augured well for the efficiency of the relatively more competitive
segment of the industry composed of small plants -- which, as earlier
noted, appears to be the main contributor to the increases in efficiency
in the entire industry -- it also efl_cted substantial efficiency gains in
the less competitive segment.
Thus, concentration may not necessarily be harmful to an
industry. It may result because the size of the domestic market is too
small relative to the minimum efficient scale of technology employed
in the industry (SGV 1992). In this case, economies of scale
themselves imply that the efficient industry will necessarily be
concentrated.Packaging Industry I_ 87
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SURVEY RESULTS
Table 21 lists the computed EPRs and DRC-SER ratios of some
survey respondents. These firms belonged to the paper- and plastic-
based subsectors. DRCs and EPRs could not be computed for other
survey respondents because even their financial statements provided
inadequate data.
Firm-level EPRs in 1986 were all higher than the manufacturing
sector average of 38 percent. In 1991, three of the firms appear to
have received an even higher degree of protection.These belonged to
the plastic-based subsector where tariffrates on some products rose in
1991, probably to compensate for the very low levels of protection
received by the subsector prior to the 1991TRP.
Based on DRC-SEIk ratios, one of the respondents (Firm D) was
efficient -- in terms of choice of technique -- while three others
(Firms B, E, and F) were mildly inefficient in 1986.The other two
firms were inefficient, but not extremely so. In sum, the efficiency
level of the respondent firms was high in 1986.
IIIIIIIIIIIII III I III • I II
Table21
SurveyResults
Firm DRC DRCI SER* EPR
1986 1991 1986 1991 1986 1991
A 43.54 85.09 1.62 2.58 85.18 91.78
B 33.54 42.53 1.25 1.29 78.58 62.62
C 53.99 34.22 2.01 1.04 91.98 104.63
D 19.64 25.43 0.73 0.77 57.60 67.51
E 33.80 18.56 1.26 0.56 58.25 6.16
F 36.34 43.51 1.35 1.32 79.67 64.47
* DRC/ SERratios areInterpreted asfollows:
0.01-1.20 : Efficient
1.21- 1.50: Mildly Inefficient
>1.50 : Inefficient
SER(Shadow Exchange Rates) for1986 was 26.8672 and 32.9743 for1991.
Source ofbasic data: Financial Statements and Balance Sheets olotaJned from the Securities and Exchange
Commbsion,
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The farms appear to have significantly gained in efficiency and
comparative advantage in 1991.Three firms were efficient (Firms C,
D, and E), two were mildly inefficient (Firms B and F), and only one
firm was inefficient (FirmA).
Firm E, which proved to be the most efficient among the firms,
also received the leastprotection in 1991.Three other firms (Firms B,
D, and F) with relatively lower Dt(C-SER. ratios also had relatively
lower EPR.s.Firm C, which proved to be efficient but which appears
to have been highly protected, is an example of a firm for which
protection has become redundant. This firm probably received large
economic rents.Thus, the level of efficiency appears to be negatively
associated with the level of protection. These results are consistent
with those obtained from Census data.
• WORLD COMPETITIVENESS: COMPARISON WITH THE
PACKAGING INDUSTRIES OF MALAYSIA AND THAILAND
Philexport (199_) revealsthat the packaging industries of Malaysia
andThailand are afew years ahead of their Philippine counterpart. In
the last four or fiveyears,these countries have employed technologies
that are still unknown in the Philippines. An important catalyst for
the growth of the packaging industries of these countries may be the
rapid growth of their food-exporting sectors, particularly that of
Thailand (De Dios et al. 1993).As earlier mentioned, the growth of
the packaging industry is closely tied to the growth of its end-using
sectors.
In the metal-based subsector, the two countries have started
producing beverage cans, unlike the Philippines. Moreover, all food
and beverage cans in these two countries are welded, while many tin
can manufacturers in the country still use the soldering process.
As for plastic-based products, our ASEAN neighbors have greater
experience in the production of polyethylene terephthalate (PET)
bottles, and also have the facility to blow-mold 210 liter plastic drums.
There is also awider range offlexible materials and laminates in these
other countries, although the best laminates produced locally are
comparable with these.Packaging Industry P 89
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Paper-based packaging products produced in the two countries
are considered of superior quality because of the insistence on the use
of virgin kraft.
The packaging industries of our ASEAN neighbors also offer a
greater diversity of food containers, make extensive use ofbarcoding,
palletization, and shrink and Stretch wrapping. In the glass-based
subsector, however, the Philippines is way ahead of its ASEAN
neighbors. As for price competitiveness, locally-produced metal
containers are more expensive--59 percent above the margin for steel
drums and beverage bottles and 5 percent for crowns.The wedges for
tuna cans range from 14 to 50 percent.7
Summary, Conclusions,
and Policy Recommendations
Tt-m results of this study indicate that the TLP has rationalized the
protection structure and, thus, reduced the level of aUocative
inefficiency in the packaging industry. Subsector- and plant-level
EPR.s generally declined between t 983 and 1988, wit.hcorresponding
decreases DI_C-SER ratios.The glass-based subsector appears to have
been the biggest gainer in allocative efficiency; the metal-based
subsector, the least gainer.
Improvements in aUocative efficiency appear to have been due
mainly to increases in the efficiency of smallplants.The proportion of
efficient small plants to the industry total increased in 1988_Since the
majority of new establishments in 1988 were small, these small new
entrants were most probably efficient. The easier access to raw
materials afforded by the earlier deregulation of packaging raw
material importation (relative to finished goods importation) probably
encouraged and facilitated the entry of these small plants into the
industry.The threat of competition resulting from lower tariffrates on
finished goods, on the other hand, may have forced these plants to
adopt efficient practices, thus leading to a rise in the level ofefficiency
in the industry in 1988.
Efficiency improvements among medium- and large-scale
establishments were also observed. Since the share of large plants in
the industry census value added (CVA) increased between 1983 and
1988, there indeed seems to have been an improvement in resource
allocation: more resources appear to have been channelled into
efficient plants.
There was also an improvement in competitive advantage after
the TLP, as indicated by the lower DP,.CM-OEP,. ratios. However, it92 4 Ma.Cristina S,Medilo
appears that gains in comparative advantage (again measured by the
DRC-SER ratio) were greater than those in competitive advantage.
The glass-based subsector, which posted significant gains in
comparative advantage, and which became efficient after the TLE
remained uncompetitive in 1988. Since the measure used to indicate
competitive advantage (DKCM/OEK) did not consider tax- and
wage-related as well as foreign exchange distortions, it seems that
these three are indeed major sources of distortions.
The findings of the study seem to support the import discipline
hypothesis.Although import penetration rates even declined for some
subsectors between 1983 and 1988, allocative efficiency nonetheless
gained ground. Without actualcompetition from imports, the mere
threatof compotition appears to have forced incumbents to become
more efficient while allowing entry mainly to efficient plants.
Computed D1LC/SEK and EPR values of soine survey
respondents for 1986 and 1991 seem consistent with these
conclusions, which are based on Census data.
These results are encouraging; the objective of trade liberalization
is not to swamp the local market with imported products and,
consequently, to stifle local industries, but only to create an
atmosphere of competition Conducive to improvements in efficiency
and competitiveness.
Since the mere threat of competition from imports appears to
have induced an overall improvement in allocative efficiency, there
seem to be no structural barriers to imPorting in the industry, even if
there are structural barriers to entry in production in the glass-based
subsector.
Technical efficiency appears to have declined in 1988.There was a
general -- though insignificant- drop inTECs across the subsectors.
However, some plants did show technical efficiency improvements.
A possible explanation for the contrasting movements of the
DRC-SER. and TEC measures between 1983 and 1988 is thatthe
latter may be lessan indicatorof deviations from efficientor "best-practice"
technologythan of deviations from the "average"technicalffflciencyof the
plants in a given subsector. It is possible,then, that the average deviation
widenedbecausePackaging Industry b 93
1) the most efficientones (that is, those at the frontier) improvedtheir
technicalf_iciencymorethan the restoftheplants in the subsector; or
2) the most efficient ones declined in output, which influenced the
subsectoral averageTECs.
The real •reason cannot• be ascertained, however, due to data
constraints. • ,
In any case, the results highlight the importance •of non-price
barriers to technical efficiency,such as:
1) inadequat e or difficult accessto supplier technology;
2) lack of standards and the means of enforcing existing standards;
and
3) low demand because ofthe sluggishgrowth ofend-using industries.
Thus, policies other than the TLP seem to be necessary.
The TLP seems to have had varying effects on the industrial
structure of the different subsectors. Production concentration
increased in the glass- andplastic-based subsectors and declined in the
metal- and paper-based subsectors in 1988. Parallelmovements were
observed in the case of price-cost margins, the indicator used to
measure the degree of market power and the presence of entry
barriers. This supports the findings of earlier studies on the positive
rehtionship between concentration and price-cost margins.
Although the number ofphnts increased in allsubsectors in 1988,
the glass- and plastic-based groups became more concentrated,
probably because in these subsectors the expansion of large plants
outstrippedthe entry ofsmallplants (which comprised the majority of
new entrants). This seems to be particuhrly true for the gho-_-based
subsector which is characterized by large economies of scale.Taking
advantage of these scale economies, the large glass-based plants must
have increased their market share and also significantly increased their
price-cost margins.
The fact that trade reform did not reduce the level of
concentration in the glass-based subsector, however, does not
undermine its apparently positive effect on the allocative efficiency of94 .11 Ma,Cristina S.Medilo
this subsector, which in fact, was the biggest gainer in efficiency
among all the subsectors. Plant-level data reveal that the allocative
efficiency gains of this subsector were due to large plants.Thus, even
as trade reform appears to have augured well for the efficiency of the
relatively more competitive segment of the industry composed of
small plants which, appear to be mainly responsible for the allocative
efficiency improvements in the entire industry it also seems to have
effected substantial efficiency gains in the less competitive segment.
Thus, concentration need not be harmful to an industry. If it is
due to economies of scale-- asin the caseof the glass-based subsector
it can even serve to enhance the beneficial effects of trade reform
on efficiency.
Hence, the positive impact of the TLP on the performance and
competitiveness of the Philippine packaging industry cannot be
overemphasized. While recognizing that efficiency and productivity
gains cannot be wholly ascribed to the TLP, the study, thus,
recommends afollow-up tariff reform programwhich would further
reduce the rates on both packaging goods and raw materials to
minimal levels.The insignificant rise in imports implies that current
rates are still too high, considering the natural and policy-related
barriers to importing.
Lowered rates in packaging products will enable end-users to
become more competitive in export markets, thus increasing the
demand for packaging. Increased demand, a major force in
technological innovation and quality improvements, will in turn
benefit the packaging industry.
In view of the non-price factors affecting the level of technical
efficiency cited above,non-tariff related measures also seem necessary.
The establishment of a National Packaging Center, which may
function asarepository of packaging standards and technology-related
information, would be an important step in this direction. But first,
the real economic contribution of the Center would have to be
established through cost-benefit analysis. If the project is proven
feasible, industry people can tap local-private or foreign financial
institutions for its implementation to easethe pressure on government
funds.Packaging Industry _ 95
The conclusions reached in the study are based mostly on patterns
observed at the subsector level, which were generalized for the
industry. Since the packaging industry includes heterogeneous
subsectors, more precise conclusions and recommendations can be
made with an in-depth study of the individual subsectors, focusing on
firm-level characteristics. A more comprehensive assessment of the
impact of the TLP may also be made using more recent data covering
the 1991 TRt_.The study does not adequately capture the effects of
the reforms since it relies mainly on data for a limited time frame
(1983-1988), which coincided with the period of implementation.Selected Bibliography
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